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I. INTRODUCTION
John Doe, a veteran of the U.S. military, receives medical benefits
through the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). As a recipient of those
benefits, Doe is eligible to obtain free medical care at any VA facility
until his death. One day, Doe undergoes surgery at a VA hospital. As he
recovers from the operation, Doe suffers brain damage and eventually
falls into a coma. As guardian ad litem, his wife, Jane, sues the United
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging medical
negligence. Jane seeks to recover, among other things, future medical
expenses on her husband’s behalf. The United States concedes liability,
but the parties dispute damages. At trial, Jane testifies that she intends
to keep her husband at VA facilities while he is comatose. What result?1
Under the prevailing view, Jane is entitled to recover a cash award for
the present value of her husband’s future medical expenses.2 In the
same vein, the United States, as defendant, is not able to reduce Jane’s
damage award by the value of the VA medical care that her husband will
receive in the future. The validity of this result depends on probing two
legal rules: the provisions of the FTCA and the collateral source rule.
As a limited waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity, the
FTCA provides an avenue through which an injured person can reach
into Congress’s pockets and recover for the government’s tortious
conduct.3 Though somewhat paradoxically, the FTCA holds the United

1. I owe this hypothetical’s factual pattern to Rufino v. United States, 642 F.
Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 829 F.2d 354
(2d Cir. 1987). In Rufino, the court declined to allow the plaintiff to recover damages for
future medical expenses. Id. at 86. The court found it significant that the veteran’s
family had decided to keep the veteran at VA facilities ever since the injury. Id. at 85–
86. The court also noted that any damage award for future medical expenses would
benefit only the veteran’s family, not the veteran, who was comatose. See id. The
plaintiff in Rufino did not appeal the lower court’s decision to deny her claim for future
medical expenses. See 829 F.2d at 356. After extensive research, Rufino appears to be
the only published decision not to award future medical expenses under the FTCA to a
veteran who was entitled to free VA medical care.
2. See infra Part II.E.
3. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401(b), 2671–2680 (2006). Under the FTCA, the
fora in which litigants must pursue their claims are the U.S. district courts. Stephen L.
Nelson, The King’s Wrongs and the Federal District Courts: Understanding the
Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 51 S. TEX. L. REV.
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States liable to the “same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances.”4 In determining the extent to which the United States
should be held liable under the FTCA, courts must apply the substantive
law of the state where the tort occurred.5
On the issue of damages, the FTCA expressly limits a claimant’s
reach to money judgments that compensate the claimant for his or her
loss, including those awards that serve to compensate for future medical
expenses.6 As the introductory fact pattern indicates, calculating future
medical expenses for FTCA plaintiffs who are veterans of the U.S. military
is complex, primarily because veterans—who likely will receive VA medical
care in the future—seek to recover expenses they will never incur—
expenses the tortfeasor, the U.S. government, will eventually foot the bill
for.7 As a societal segment who likely will receive VA medical care in
the future, veteran-plaintiffs, simply by virtue of their status as veterans,
pose a unique problem to courts and test just how effectively the tort
system computes damages.8 The undeniable reality in these cases is that
veterans ask the United States to “pay . . . twice for the same injuries”:

259, 271 (2009). But before litigants may file their FTCA claims in the district courts,
they must first present them to the “appropriate Federal agency,” which has six months
to deny or otherwise dispose of the claims. Chelsea Sage Durkin, Comment, How
Strong Stands the Federal Tort Claims Act Wall? The Effect of the Good Samaritan and
Negligence Per Se Doctrines on Governmental Tort Liability, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 269, 270
(2007) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Further, the FTCA does not completely abrogate the United States’ sovereign
immunity. Instead, the statute contains thirteen exceptions that operate to bar litigants’
claims against the United States, including claims arising in a foreign country and claims
arising out of government activity based on: the performance of a discretionary function,
mishandled letters by postal service employees, the United States’ monetary activities,
armed forces’ combat activities, the Panama Canal Company’s activities, the Tennessee
Valley Authority’s activities, tax collection, several intentional torts, admiralty, wars,
quarantines, and banks. Nelson, supra, at 271 & n.55.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
5. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9–12 (1962).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (exempting the United States from liability for prejudgment
interest or for punitive damages).
7. See, e.g., Amlotte v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 2d 922 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
8. Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The Collateral Source Rule, 77
HARV. L. REV. 741, 741 n.7 (1964) (providing, incidentally, the basis of the veteranplaintiffs’ argument that the deterrent rationale underlying the collateral source rule is
undermined when one government branch causes the injury and another pays the damage
award).
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first through federal benefits and then through a damage award for future
medical expenses.9
The relationship between a veteran’s status as a recipient of federal
benefits and the veteran’s request for future medical expenses in tort
implicates the collateral source rule.10 As a common law doctrine still
intact today, the rule prohibits courts from reducing a plaintiff’s damage
award by “collateral” compensation—or to put it plainly, by compensation
received from a source other than the tortfeasor.11 By even greater force
of logic, then, the collateral source rule allows courts to reduce a
plaintiff’s damage award if the tortfeasor has compensated or promised
to compensate the plaintiff for injuries suffered.12 Along these lines, the
United States, in defending against veteran-plaintiffs’ FTCA claims,
argues the collateral source rule should not apply because the VA
medical care to which veterans are entitled is not a collateral benefit.13
In syllogistic terms, the United States’ argument is as follows:
Major premise: Under the collateral source rule, a plaintiff cannot
recover damages for compensation he or she has received or will receive
from the tortfeasor.
Minor premise: The United States is obliged to provide eligible
veterans with VA medical care for injuries suffered.
Conclusion: A veteran-plaintiff eligible for VA medical benefits who
sues the United States for personal injuries cannot recover damages for
future medical expenses because the veteran will receive compensation
—medical care—from the tortfeasor—the United States.
Veteran-plaintiffs, of course, respond in kind, countering with arguments
grounded in federal precedent.14 It is simply unfair, veterans argue with
the weight of several federal judges behind them, to substitute future VA
medical care they are entitled to receive for a cash award they could use,
9. Defendant’s Post-Trial Memorandum of Points & Authorities Showing that
the Court Should Deduct the Value of Past and Future Federal Benefits from Any
Potential Award of Damages at 1, Schoenfeld v. Quamme, No. 3:02CV00819 (S.D. Cal.
Sept. 14, 2009), 2009 WL 3500909 [hereinafter Defendant’s P&A]; see also Brooks v.
United States, 337 U.S. 49, 53–54 (1949) (noting the United States is forced to pay twice
for the same injuries in this scenario).
10. Note, supra note 8, at 741 n.7.
11. Michael I. Krauss & Jeremy Kidd, Collateral Source and Tort’s Soul, 48 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 1, 8 (2009) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A
(1979)).
12. Accord In re Air Crash Near Cerritos, 982 F.2d 1271, 1277 (9th Cir. 1992);
Thomas v. Shelton, 740 F.2d 478, 484–85 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Note, supra note 8, at
741 (contending courts can mitigate damages without upsetting the tort system’s main
objectives if tortfeasors themselves reduce the plaintiff’s loss).
13. See, e.g., Feeley v. United States, 337 F.2d 924, 934 (3d Cir. 1964) (“The
government argues . . . [it] will be forced to pay twice for this future [medical] care,
which it is not required to do under [collateral source] principles.”).
14. See infra Part II.

504

[VOL. 49: 501, 2012]

Future Medical Expenses
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

if they so wished, to pay for medical care at a private hospital.15 This
fairness consideration, along with the bulwark of precedent—the logical
underpinning of which is less than pellucid—ultimately is sufficient to
carry the day; courts consistently hold in the veteran-plaintiffs’ favor and
allow them to recover future medical expenses without requiring an
offset.16
This Comment probes why courts reach that conclusion, especially in
an era of increasing national debt and expanded government liability.17
The simple answer, as the harrowing metaphors used to describe
veteran-plaintiffs’ injuries remind us,18 may indeed be fairness or
justice.19 But without a defense of conventional wisdom, that answer is
only as simple as the chancellor’s foot is lengthy.20 Maybe the answer
has its roots in logic, but forcing a tortfeasor to pay twice plainly spells
overcompensation. Perhaps the text of the FTCA provides an answer,
but even a cursory glance at the statute reveals that it does not. The
upshot is a jurisprudence that is wrong in policy, logic, and law.

15. Or to pay down their mortgage. Or to pay for their ice cream addiction. Or to
donate to their favorite charity. The point here is that the alternative—entitlement to VA
medical care—necessarily predetermines the use to which they put their damage award,
which is inconsistent with the familiar tort principle that plaintiffs need not use their
damage recoveries for any specific purpose. See John A. Lovett, Doctrines of Waste in a
Landscape of Waste, 72 MO. L. REV. 1209, 1236–40 (2007).
16. See, e.g., Molzof v. United States, 6 F.3d 461, 468 (7th Cir. 1993). But cf.
Rufino v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 84, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (allowing offset), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 829 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1987). Interestingly, the
court in Rufino did not even mention New York’s collateral source rule in its opinion.
Instead, the court used a balancing test in determining that the veteran’s lack of
dissatisfaction with the VA system meant he would more likely than not use the free VA
medical care in the future. Id.
17. See infra Part IV.B–C.
18. Plaintiff’s Trial Brief at 10, Schoenfeld v. Quamme, No. 3:02CV00819 (S.D.
Cal. Nov. 23, 2008), 2008 WL 7022606 (quoting a medicine and rehabilitation expert
who analogized the veteran-plaintiff’s leg injuries to “a wooden frame structure where
the frame is suffering from dry rot and the attached lumber is coming loose and falling
off” and followed the analogy with his prognosis that “[a]ny attempt to reattach the
lumber on the frame structure with either nails, glue, or other devices[] will be met with
poor results because the frame is not adequate”).
19. See G. Michael Harz, Comment, The Liability of the United States Government
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 66 DENV. U. L. REV. 601, 617–18 (1988) (noting
that the government exists to serve the people fairly and “justice” would be “denied” if
the United States did not have to pay for a veteran’s future medical expenses).
20. See JOHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 43–44 (Frederick Pollock ed.,
Quaritch 1927) (1689) (reducing equity to a subjective measure that changes from person
to person, as the size of the “Chancellor’s foot” varies from chancellor to chancellor).
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In this Comment, I aim to expose the jurisprudential flaws in this area
of the law and advocate as my prescription a refocused jurisprudence.
Part II describes how courts have historically come to the conclusion
that veterans suing under the FTCA should be awarded future medical
expenses despite their entitlement to VA medical care. In sorting through
several pertinent cases, this Part summarizes the framework courts have
used when awarding future medical expenses to veterans under the FTCA.
Part III addresses a threshold issue: the extent to which courts using
this framework have overcompensated veterans. Overcompensation occurs
only insofar as veterans in fact pocket the damage award and continue to
rely on the VA medical care to which they are entitled. Yet factual data
on this point does not exist. That reality grounds my analysis, and in this
Part, I ask instead whether veterans who are awarded damages for future
medical expenses are likely to use that money to seek private medical
care. The object of this “likely” standard is analysis that probes the extent
to which veterans are satisfied with the VA system. This Part finds that
veterans are very satisfied with the VA system and thus concludes that
veterans will ultimately pocket the cash award and rely on the VA
medical care to which they are entitled. This scenario results in
overcompensation.
Having established that overcompensation is likely, I address in Part
IV why overcompensating veterans under the FTCA matters on a policy
level. This Part identifies a trend under which expanded government
liability and voluminous claims against the United States exacerbate the
pattern of overcompensation discussed above. It concludes that the issue
needs to be addressed and that the outcome should be changed.
Part V exposes the problems with the courts’ jurisprudence and provides
a solution that breathes meaning into the FTCA’s text, a text that courts
largely have abandoned as a collection of catchword phrases. In hewing
more closely to the FTCA’s text, this solution would supplant the courts’
former reasoning, such that veterans suing under the FTCA would be
unable to recover future medical expenses to the extent that they are
entitled to receive free VA medical care.
II. TRACING THE COURTS’ MODERN JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Collateral Source Aspect
A logical starting point in tracing the courts’ modern jurisprudence is
the text of the FTCA, which explains that the substantive law of the state
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in which the tort took place governs in FTCA actions.21 Accordingly,
state collateral source rules apply under the FTCA.22 Although several
states have statutorily abolished or modified the collateral source rule,23
numerous others have retained the rule. Each state has variations in its
collateral source rule, but the rule generally provides that “if an injured
party receives some compensation for his injuries from a source wholly
independent of the tortfeasor, such payment should not be deducted from
the damages which the plaintiff would otherwise collect from the
tortfeasor.” 24 In other words, courts will not reduce a plaintiff’s damage
award by any compensation the plaintiff has received from a source
wholly independent of the tortfeasor.
Although the paradigm that the collateral source rule seeks to create is
rather simple, a level of complexity arises when determining whether
government benefits are collateral to a plaintiff’s damage award in an
FTCA action.25 This is because state collateral source rules “do[] not
necessarily take into consideration cases in which the United States is a
defendant—as well as the payer of . . . benefits—nor would [they] since
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over injury claims against the
United States for money damages.”26
Thus, to remedy the awkward application of state collateral source
rules to government benefits in FTCA actions, federal courts have
fashioned a body of federal common law in an attempt to define whether
and when government benefits are collateral in FTCA actions.27 In this
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006), construed in Richards v. United States, 369
U.S. 1, 9–12 (1962).
22. See, e.g., Molzof v. United States, 6 F.3d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying
Wisconsin’s collateral source rule in an FTCA action). Despite their evidentiary
components, state collateral source rules are considered substantive laws. 19 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4512 (2d ed. 1996).
23. For an exhaustive list of states that have modified their collateral source rules,
see Kevin S. Marshall & Patrick W. Fitzgerald, The Collateral Source Rule and Its
Abolition: An Economic Perspective, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 57 app. I at 71–79
(2005).
24. Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 63 (Cal. 1970) (citing Peri
v. L.A. Junction Ry., 137 P.2d 441, 452 (Cal. 1943)).
25. See, e.g., Amlotte v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 2d 922 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
26. Id. at 927 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)).
27. Note, supra note 8, at 741 n.7 (noting that the test sought to resolve “problems
of identity” that arose “[w]hen one branch of the government is the tortfeasor and
another branch pays for the loss”). Inherent in this analysis is the demonstrable fact that
courts did not create the federal test blindly. Instead, the federal test is based on the
spirit of state collateral source rules. For example, most state collateral source rules
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Comment I refer to that body of law as the “federal test.” Under the
federal test, courts have held that government benefits are collateral—
and thus cannot be used to reduce a plaintiff’s damage award—if (1) the
benefits “come[] from a specially funded source distinct from the
unsegregated general revenues” of the U.S. Treasury,28 or (2) the plaintiff
has contributed to the benefits.29
To give an example of the federal test as applied, plaintiffs in FTCA
actions can recover damages for medical expenses without a judicially
mandated reduction of the award by the value of the Medicare benefits
to which they are entitled.30 This is because the government distributes
Medicare benefits out of a fund to which Medicare recipients contribute;
this fund is supplied by social security taxes, which Medicare recipients
have paid.31 To give another example, under the FTCA courts will reduce a
veteran’s damage award for medical expenses by the value of TRICARE
benefits to which the veteran is entitled primarily because “[a]ll of the
money for the [TRICARE] program comes from the general treasury of
the United States.”32
Logically, then, under the federal test, baseline VA medical benefits
are not collateral to an FTCA award. This is true because (1) VA medical

require the source of the collateral payments to be “wholly independent” from the
tortfeasor. See, e.g., Helfend, 465 P.2d at 63 (citing Peri, 137 P.2d at 452). United
States v. Harue Hayashi suggested a federal equivalent—collateral payments are those
payable from specially funded revenues, and noncollateral payments are those funded by
the U.S. Treasury. 282 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1960). Additionally, many state
collateral source rules require collateral benefits to be those to which the plaintiff has
contributed. See, e.g., Kickham v. Carter, 335 S.W.2d 83, 90 (Mo. 1960) (“Upon
principle there would appear to be no logical reason for defendant to receive the benefit
of hospitalization payments (in the nature of insurance) made by an organization such as
Blue Cross to which plaintiff had no doubt made contributions in accordance with a
membership agreement.”). The Eight Circuit, in adopting that very same principle, has
supplied the federal equivalent. See Overton v. United States, 619 F.2d 1299, 1305–06
(8th Cir. 1980).
28. Molzof v. United States, 6 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Harue
Hayashi, 282 F.2d 599).
29. Id. (citing Overton, 619 F.2d 1299). Most courts have held that a veteran’s
service in the U.S. military does not qualify as a “contribution” within the meaning of
this test. See, e.g., Mays v. United States, 806 F.2d 976, 977 (10th Cir. 1986).
30. Berg v. United States, 806 F.2d 978, 985 (10th Cir. 1986). Although the court
in Berg began its discussion by addressing Colorado’s collateral source rule, it did not
rely on state law to decide the issue. See id. at 984 (quoting Kistler v. Halsey, 481 P.2d
722, 724 (Colo. 1971)). Instead, the court relied on federal cases from other circuits that
had applied the federal test. See id. at 985 (collecting cases).
31. Id.
32. Mays, 806 F.2d at 977. As it did in Berg, the Tenth Circuit first addressed
Colorado’s collateral source rule. See id. (quoting Kistler, 481 P.2d at 724). It then
decided the issue by considering the “source of the funds” as it related to the federal test.
See id. at 977 n.3. For a discussion of what TRICARE is, see infra Part IV.C.
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benefits are paid from the General Treasury of the United States,33 and
(2) veterans do not contribute monetarily to their baseline VA medical
benefits.34 But if VA medical benefits are not collateral, why do courts
allow veterans to recover future medical expenses under the FTCA? After
all, courts allowing recovery generally agree that VA medical benefits
are not collateral within the meaning of the federal test.35 It is against
this backdrop that Part II.B traces the modern jurisprudence to which
courts adhere.
B. Brooks v. United States
As previously discussed, courts generally allow veterans to recover future
medical expenses under the FTCA.36 To get to that outcome, however,
courts have departed from the Supreme Court’s dicta in Brooks v. United
States.37 In Brooks, the Court held that statutory provisions for veterans’
disability payments did not forbid veterans from suing under the FTCA.38
The Court then remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit to determine
whether veterans’ disability benefits should offset their damage awards.39
In so remanding, the Court hinted that it saw “no indication that Congress
meant the United States to pay twice for the same injury” when veterans
sued under the FTCA.40 On remand, the Fourth Circuit deducted the
veteran’s disability benefits from his damage award.41 The court’s reasoning
mirrored the Supreme Court’s dicta:

33. Note, supra note 8, at 741 n.7.
34. Determine Cost of Care, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.va.
gov/healthbenefits/cost/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
35. See, e.g., Walsh v. United States, No. 07-CV-568-PJC, 2009 WL 3755553, at
*4 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 31, 2009) (allowing the plaintiff to recover future medical expenses
“[r]egardless of whether the medical benefits . . . constitute a collateral source”). But cf.
Molzof v. United States, 6 F.3d 461, 468 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding, in the alternative, that
VA medical benefits are collateral under the federal test because veterans contribute to
them). The Molzof court concluded that veterans contribute to their VA medical benefits
through the blood, sweat, and toil of their military service. Id. at 467.
36. See supra Part I.
37. 337 U.S. 49, 53 (1949). Perhaps to justify their departure from the Supreme
Court’s reasoning, other courts have downplayed Brooks’s significance with sleights of
hand, and most notably so in Feeley, in which the court thought it “clear that [the
language in Brooks] is not holding, or even dictum.” 337 F.2d 924, 933 (3d Cir. 1964).
38. Brooks, 337 U.S. at 53.
39. Id. at 54.
40. Id. at 53–54.
41. United States v. Brooks, 176 F.2d 482, 484 (4th Cir. 1949).
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It seems perfectly clear that in making the award of damages to plaintiff
nothing should be included on account of hospital or medical expenses which
the government has paid . . . . It seems equally clear that the award should be
diminished by the amount which he has received or is to receive from the
government by way of disability benefits.42

The Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit in Brooks clarified the
framework courts should use in approaching windfall scenarios arising
in FTCA actions. First, as the Fourth Circuit did on remand, courts must
follow the FTCA’s textual requirements and look to the substantive law
of the state where the tort occurred. 43 In Brooks, for example, North
Carolina law precluded a plaintiff from recovering damages from a
tortfeasor if another defendant had already compensated the plaintiff for
injuries suffered.44 Second, Brooks clarified that courts should resolve
issues arising under the FTCA in light of the policy that Congress, in
passing the FTCA, had no intention of forcing the United States to pay
twice for a single injury.45
C. Feeley v. United States
A few years after Brooks in Feeley v. United States, the United States,
as defendant, asked the Third Circuit to adopt the Brooks framework and
deduct the value of a veteran’s entitlement to VA medical care from a
damage award for medical expenses.46 The United States grounded its
position on collateral source law and reasoned the benefits did not come
from a source independent of the tortfeasor.47 In determining the merits,
the Feeley court first discussed Pennsylvania’s collateral source rule.48

42. Id. (emphasis added). For these propositions, the court cited Holland v.
Southern Public Utilities Co., which held that under state law the amount another
defendant pays the plaintiff should be credited against what the plaintiff otherwise would
recover for his or her injury. 180 S.E. 592, 593–94 (N.C. 1935).
43. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9–12 (1962).
44. See Holland, 180 S.E. at 593–94.
45. 337 U.S. at 53–54.
46. 337 F.2d 924, 934 (3d Cir. 1964).
47. See id. at 927–28.
48. Id. at 928. The court purported to research whether, in a lawsuit against a
private defendant, Pennsylvania law would require the plaintiff’s damage award to be
offset by the VA medical care that the plaintiff had received. Id. at 927. Curiously, the
court also noted that it could not find any Pennsylvania cases in which the state was both
a defendant and payer of medical benefits. Id. at 932. Using the state as an analog
misses the point because the FTCA holds the United States liable to the same extent as a
private individual—not a government entity—under like circumstances. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2674 (2006). Indeed, the Supreme Court has interpreted the words of the FTCA to
“mean what they say, namely, that the United States waives sovereign immunity ‘under
circumstances’ where local law would make a ‘private person’ liable in tort.” United
States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 44 (2005) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006)).
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It then declared Pennsylvania’s collateral source rule to be “of little
help” and looked to Brooks to guide its inquiry.49
In considering Brooks, the court agreed to deduct past medical expenses
from the award.50 But it refused to follow Brooks’s rationale on future
medical expenses, primarily because the court thought it “unconscionable”
to force plaintiffs to choose between using public hospitals and bearing
the costs of the medical expenses themselves.51 The court’s language
deserves quotation here at length:
[A]cceptance of the government’s position would result in forcing the plaintiff,
financially speaking, to seek only the available public assistance. Private medical
care would be obtained at the plaintiff’s own expense. We think that this is an
unconscionable burden to place on the plaintiff. A victim of another’s tort
is entitled . . . to choose . . . his own doctor . . . .52

D. Molzof v. United States
The Seventh Circuit confronted this same issue in Molzof v. United
States.53 The Seventh Circuit first explained the interplay between state
collateral source rules and awarding future medical expenses.54 The court
may have felt obligated to address Wisconsin’s collateral source rule
because the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit
with specific instructions to “evaluate the recoverability of [damages

49. 337 F.2d at 932–33.
50. Id. at 933–34.
51. Id. at 935.
52. Id. at 934–35. Following Feeley’s lead, a district court in Connecticut awarded
future medical expenses to a veteran who sued the United States for medical
maltreatment he received at a VA hospital. See Powers v. United States, 589 F. Supp.
1084, 1108 (D. Conn. 1984). At that time, the collateral source rule in Connecticut
applied to “medical payments” and had “long been in effect in th[at] jurisdiction.”
Gorham v. Farmington Motor Inn, Inc., 271 A.2d 94, 96 (Conn. 1970). Unlike the
Feeley court, however, the Powers court did not analyze Connecticut’s collateral source
rule. In fact, the court did not even mention the collateral source rule, nor did it cite to
any Connecticut cases. Instead, Powers simply explained that future VA medical
benefits were “far too speculative” to determine with any certainty. 589 F. Supp. at 1108. It
also agreed with Feeley that veterans have a right to select a doctor of their choice. Id.
(citing Feeley, 337 F.2d at 934–35). Specifically, the court stated that deducting the
plaintiff’s VA medical benefits from the damage award for future medical expenses
would “unduly limit and virtually pre-determine . . . the source of such medical care.”
Id.
53. 6 F.3d 461, 468 (7th Cir. 1993).
54. Id. at 464.
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for future medical expenses] under Wisconsin law.”55 The Court also
hinted that a setoff might be necessary, opining that Wisconsin law might
“require[] a setoff when a [private] defendant already has . . . agreed
to pay[] expenses incurred by the plaintiff.”56
Despite the hint, the Seventh Circuit held that Wisconsin would
categorize a veteran’s VA medical benefits as collateral.57 In so concluding,
the court grounded its analysis on a Wisconsin state case, Smith v.
United Services Automobile Ass’n.58 In that case, a serviceman received
free medical care at a naval hospital after he and the defendant collided
in a car accident.59 The serviceman sued to recover the value of those
services under his father’s insurance policy, which covered medical
expenses. 60 The insurance company denied liability, contending the
serviceman did not incur any expenses while hospitalized.61 Siding with
the serviceman, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the policy required
the insurer to pay up.62 In ruling, the court noted that state precedent
differentiated between “gratuitously provided” services and services for
which a plaintiff had paid consideration.63 Because, the court reasoned,
veterans were entitled to medical care as “compensation for services
rendered,” not as a gift, the state precedent governing gratuitous services
was inapplicable.64
On this logic, the Seventh Circuit in Molzof concluded that VA medical
benefits were collateral because veterans did not receive those benefits
without first “contributing part of [their] salary to sustain the program.”65
According to the court, veterans “contributed” to the VA benefits insofar
as they received “lower salar[ies] in order to defray the costs” of their
medical care.66 In other words, the court argued, veterans contribute to
the VA medical benefits to which they are entitled through the blood,
sweat, and toil of their military service.67
The court could have stopped at that point in the opinion because
Smith appeared to preclude the United States from reducing the plaintiff’s
damage award by his VA medical benefits. But on the opinion went,
55. 502 U.S. 301, 312 (1992). The Supreme Court did not resolve the issue
because the lower courts did not address it. Id.
56. Id.
57. Molzof, 6 F.3d at 467.
58. 190 N.W.2d 873 (Wis. 1971).
59. Id. at 873.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 874.
62. Id. at 875.
63. Id. at 874–75.
64. Id. at 875.
65. 6 F.3d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1993).
66. Id.
67. Id. (noting that a veteran’s “consideration is his service”).
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presumably because the court believed state law’s garb was insufficient
to adequately clothe its decision. Indeed, the court went on to justify its
holding in light of the Feeley framework.68 It first noted that other cases
consistently had held that past medical benefits were not collateral to an
FTCA award.69 It then reasoned that those cases were inapposite because
“[t]he plaintiff here . . . does not seek compensation for past medical
treatment, only future medical treatment.”70 For that proposition, the
court cited Feeley and held that the plaintiff could recover future medical
expenses from the United States despite his entitlement to VA medical
care.71
E. Modern Jurisprudence
Taken together, Feeley and Molzof clarify the framework courts use in
determining whether a veteran may recover future medical expenses in
an FTCA action—the modern jurisprudence to which courts adhere.
First, most courts begin the inquiry by addressing the collateral source
rule of the state where the tort occurred.72 The inquiry is almost
superficial, however, because these courts consistently conclude that
state collateral source rules do not help answer whether VA medical
benefits are collateral to an FTCA damage award.73 Next, courts look
68. Id. at 467–68 (citing Feeley v. United States, 337 F.2d 924, 935 (3d Cir.
1964)).
69. Id. at 467.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 468 (citing Feeley, 337 F.2d at 935). FTCA claimants have looked to
Molzof as the “most important case in understanding the effect of the collateral source
rule and its application when a[n FTCA] plaintiff . . . is entitled to future medical care
through the VA.” Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Opposition to Defendant’s
Post-Trial Memorandum of Points & Authorities Showing that the Court Should Deduct
the Value of Past and Future Federal Benefits from Any Potential Award or Damages at
2, Schoenfeld v. Quamme, No. 3:02CV00819 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2009), 2009 WL
3500910 [hereinafter Opposition]. Some have even referred to it as a “mandate” that
had to be followed. See, e.g., id. at 4. As the defendant in FTCA actions, however, the
United States has taken a different view of Molzof, referring to it as a case that “turned
on an estimate of a then-nonexistent state court interpretation of Wisconsin collateral
source law.” Defendant’s P&A, supra note 9, at 4; accord United States’ Response
to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 14–15, Taylor v. United States,
No. 2:09-CV-00065-J (D. Wyo. Feb. 12, 2010), 2009 WL 4459755 [hereinafter
Response] (arguing Molzof’s application of Wisconsin’s collateral source law was
“questionable” and “not well-reasoned”).
72. See, e.g., Molzof, 6 F.3d at 467; Feeley, 337 F.2d at 927.
73. See, e.g., Feeley, 337 F.2d at 932–33 (noting that “[m]ost cases involving the
United States as a defendant will be litigated in a federal forum and, certainly, all Federal
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past state law to the federal test, a body of federal common law that has
attempted to define whether and when government benefits are collateral
in FTCA actions.74
Using the federal test, several courts have held that VA medical benefits
are not collateral to an FTCA damage award “because the benefits do
not come from a specially funded source and ostensibly because the
veteran did not contribute to [the] medical benefits.”75 Thus, as to a
veteran’s past medical expenses, courts inquire no further and allow an
offset.76
Courts ruling on a veteran’s request for future medical expenses,
however, generally allow recovery because “forc[ing] a plaintiff to choose
between accepting public aid or bearing the expense of rehabilitation
himself” presents the plaintiff with “an unreasonable choice.”77 In so
reasoning, these courts add a consideration of purported fairness—
although VA medical care is not collateral, courts do not allow an offset
because a “victim of another’s tort is entitled . . . to choose . . . his own
doctor.”78
III. THE EXTENT TO WHICH COURTS OVERCOMPENSATE
VETERANS UNDER THE FTCA
Courts using the framework discussed above to allow veterans to
recover future medical expenses when they are entitled to VA medical
care do not overcompensate them per se. For instance, veterans who use
their damage awards to seek private medical care outside the VA system
Tort Claims Act cases will be in the federal courts”); Walsh v. United States, No. 07CV-568-PJC, 2009 WL 3755553, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 31, 2009).
74. See Walsh, 2009 WL 3755553, at *4.
75. Molzof, 6 F.3d at 466.
76. See, e.g., Feeley, 337 F.2d at 934; Green v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 633,
644 (E.D. Wis. 1982), aff’d on other grounds, 709 F.2d 1158 (7th Cir. 1983).
77. Feeley, 337 F.2d at 934. In the context of medical negligence cases arising
under the FTCA, courts are especially loath to allow an offset because doing so would
“force the plaintiff to undergo treatment at a [VA] facility whose sister facility
. . . caused the plaintiff to suffer [injuries].” Powers v. United States, 589 F. Supp. 1084,
1108 (D. Conn. 1984).
78. Feeley, 337 F.2d at 935. Ironically, courts adding this fairness consideration
emphasize the need for judicial restraint in the same breath. See, e.g., Molzof, 6 F.3d at
468 (opining that Congress, and not the court, should require FTCA damage awards for
future medical expenses to be offset); Ulrich v. Veterans Admin. Hosp., 853 F.2d 1078,
1084 (2d Cir. 1988) (“That this might result in a windfall for [the veteran] is a matter for
Congress, not the courts.”); Powers, 589 F. Supp. at 1108–09 (“The Court wishes to
emphasize, however, that proper Congressional action, such as tying in the set-off
provision of 38 U.S.C. § 351 . . . to the medical treatment available to veterans under
[the VA system] would eliminate not only the windfall conundrum which confronts and
concerns federal courts under these, or similar circumstances, but also protect the federal
treasury from the threat of an unnecessary double payment for the same injury.”).
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are not overcompensated at all. Overcompensation, in this sense, occurs
only insofar as veterans in fact rely on VA medical care after receiving
their damage awards.
Quantifying and qualifying the phenomenon of overcompensation
poses substantial problems, primarily because case-by-case research of it
yields imperfect results. Indeed, we cannot draw reliable conclusions from
the mere fact that, in one case, a veteran seeking future medical expenses
conceded he would continue to rely on the VA medical care to which he
was entitled.79 Similarly, we cannot extrapolate anything meaningful
from the fact that, in another case, a veteran seeking future medical
expenses lived in Europe, experienced difficulties in traveling to VA
facilities, and advised the court that he would seek private medical care
in the future.80
Instead, mining the collective conscience of veterans—and their
satisfaction with the VA system—appears to provide a more reliable
metric, even if it does not conclusively establish whether veterans will in
fact rely on VA care. At a minimum, it reliably indicates the extent to
which veterans recovering future medical expenses are likely to rely on
their VA benefits, thereby pocketing the cash award and exacerbating
the windfall problem. In that vein, this Part seeks to measure veteran
satisfaction with the VA system.
Research suggests that veterans entitled to VA health benefits
“consistently outrank[] private health” care recipients as the most
content sector of the U.S. health care population.81 As polled, areas of
satisfaction include quality of overall health care, service timeliness,
equipment and supply efficiency, treatment effectiveness, and safety in
conducting procedures.82 According to the American Customer Satisfaction
Index, eighty-five percent of inpatients at VA medical centers and
eighty-two percent of outpatients at VA clinics are satisfied with the care
given at those facilities.83 Although it may be surprising to some, this

79. Rufino v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 84, 85–86 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part on other grounds, 829 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1987).
80. Opposition, supra note 71, at 7–8.
81. Lynn Goya, Veterans To Be Offered a Personalized Veterans Health Benefits
Handbook, VETERAN J. (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.veteranjournal.com/veterans-healthbenefits-handbook/.
82. Id.
83. ACSI Scores for U.S. Federal Government 2010, A M . C USTOMER
SATISFACTION INDEX (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.theacsi.org/index.php?option=com
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satisfaction is not surprising to health care experts, many of whom
“have . . . looked to the VA’s remarkable success for significant lessons
applicable to the broader U.S. health care system.”84
Veteran satisfaction with the VA system can be attributed in part to
the Veterans Equitable Resource Allocation (VERA) program, a capitated
budgeting system in which VA facilities are given a set amount of
resources per enrolled veteran patient.85 As a capitated budgeting system,
VERA does not give VA facilities incentives to maximize billable
services. 86 Thus, without any need to produce revenue, VA facilities do
not have to forgo, and instead can focus on, the quality of care they are
providing.87
The high percentage of veterans satisfied with VA care might also be
attributable to the advanced health information technology that the VA
uses.88 Most private health care providers in the United States keep only
paper records, which often do not fully inform physicians of services
that patients have received at other medical facilities.89 Inadequacies in
paper records mean that physicians might duplicate laboratory tests, skip
over significant events in a patient’s medical history, or prescribe an
inappropriate drug or pharmaceutical.90 Under the VA system, however,
every patient has an electronic health record.91 That electronic record is
found in a department-wide database known as the Veterans Health
Information Systems and Technology Architecture (VistA).92 Full access to
a veteran patient’s health record under VistA is vitally important to the
VA’s capacity to provide adequate care and is “often cited by VA officials
as a key to the department’s efforts to achieve high quality ratings.”93
_content&view=article&id=238:asci--scores-for-us-federal-government-2010&catid=14:
asci-results&Itemid=298.
84. Michael J. Jackonis et al., War, Its Aftermath, and U.S. Health Policy: Toward
a Comprehensive Health Program for America’s Military Personnel, Veterans, and
Their Families, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 677, 678 (2008) (citing Gary J. Young et al.,
Quality Improvement in the US Veterans Health Administration, 9 INT’L J. FOR QUALITY
HEALTH CARE 183, 183–88 (1997), available at http://intqhc.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/
reprint/9/3/183.pdf); accord Catherine Arnst, The Best Medical Care in the U.S., BUS.
WK. (July 17, 2006), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_29/b3993061.
htm.
85. C ONG . B UDGET O FFICE , P UB . N O . 3016, T HE H EALTH C ARE S YSTEM FOR
V ETERANS : A N INTERIM REPORT 15 (2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/
default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/88xx/doc8892/12-21-va_healthcare.pdf.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. Indeed, electronic health records address several common problems in
health care today, including inadequacies in access to health information, results
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Further, veteran satisfaction with the VA system can be attributed to
increased government funding in the last decade. The Bush administration
coupled the VA’s medical care mission with military efforts in Afghanistan
and Iraq, and in fiscal year (FY) 2003, the administration dedicated $24
billion of the total budget to hospital and medical care for veterans.94
Anticipating thousands of veterans returning from service overseas, the
Bush administration allotted $67 billion to the VA in FY 2005 and
reserved $27 billion for hospital and medical care.95 The President’s FY
2008 budget for the VA proposed $83 billion,96 citing the need to
“[p]rovide[] medical care to over 155,000 returning . . . servicemembers.”97
In FY 2009, the Obama administration set aside $92 billion for the
VA, with $41 billion dedicated to medical care.98 The administration set
aside even more in FY 2011, increasing the VA’s budget authority to
$124 billion, with $51 billion reserved for medical care.99 President
Obama pledges that within five years he will increase the VA’s overall
budget by roughly $25 billion.100

management, and connectivity. Id. “In theory, an [electronic health record] could give
providers up-to-date information about a patient at the point of care, including his or her
history, allergies, and medications, along with the relevant diagnoses and laboratory
tests, enabling providers to . . . avoid duplicate tests and adverse drug interactions.” Id.
at 16.
94. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2003, at 288 (2002), available at http://www.
gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2003-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2003-BUD-3-14.pdf.
95. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2005, at 289–90 (2004), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2005-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2005-BUD-26.pdf.
96. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 120 (2007), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy08/pdf/budget/veterans.pdf.
97. Id. at 117.
98. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 109, 111 (2008), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2009-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2009-BUD-24.pdf.
99. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 119 (2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2011/assets/veterans.pdf.
100. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, O FFICE OF M GMT . & BUDGET,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fy2010_department_veterans (last visited Apr. 7,
2012). President Obama also has assured veterans that his new health care plan will not
change their access and entitlement to VA health care. See Tom Philpott, Obama:
Health Plan Won’t Hurt Vet Care, MILITARY.COM (Aug. 5, 2009), http://www.military.
com/features/0,15240,197017,00.html.
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Despite these budgetary developments, several studies have noted
three particular grievances that veterans have with the VA health care
system. First, VA health care services are sometimes not available in
localities in which eligible veterans live.101 Second, eligible veterans do
not always enroll in the VA health care system, either because they are
indifferent or unaware.102 Third, Congress’s slow hand in approving budgets
sometimes means that the VA must skimp, operating for extended periods
of time without the supplies or funds necessary to run facilities or purchase
medical equipment that may save veterans’ lives.103 The government is
currently attempting to address all three issues. As to the first concern,
the Obama administration promises to open VA facilities in localities
where veterans might live, with the hope that with easy access will come
more enrollment.104 As to the second concern, Obama promises to reach
out to veterans more aggressively in order to educate them on their
eligibility for VA medical benefits.105 As to the third concern, the VA
asked Congress to advance a release of $50.6 billion of the FY 2011 $57
billion total budgetary allowance for VA medical care so that funding
delays would not obstruct veterans’ access to medical care.106
Veteran satisfaction with and government attention to the VA system
make it likely that veterans recovering future medical expenses under the
FTCA will continue to rely on the VA medical care to which they
are entitled, thereby pocketing the cash award. This results in
overcompensation.
IV. WHY OVERCOMPENSATING VETERANS MATTERS
At first blush, whether courts should overcompensate veterans for their
losses under the FTCA seems microcosmic. In fact, overcompensating
plaintiffs in tort is somewhat commonplace.107 But I am not addressing
the drawbacks of overcompensation per se. Instead, I am seeking to
identify the dangers of overcompensating veterans in a world shot
through with alarming social developments.108 In this Part, I discuss

101. David Goldstein, For Veterans in Rural Areas, Health Care Can Be a Battle,
MCCLATCHY (June 7, 2011), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/06/07/115409/forveterans-in-rural-areas-health.html.
102. Philpott, supra note 100.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 99,
at 117.
107. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 391 (Ct. App.
1981) (awarding punitive damages).
108. See infra Part IV.C.
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those developments at length and articulate the dangers that attend
overcompensation at this moment in history.
A. Justice Traynor’s Tradeoff
The tort system often expands or contracts, as the case may be, to
effectuate policy preferences.109 Sometimes, it does both simultaneously.
Workers’ compensation110 and the September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund (Fund)111 are examples of this phenomenon, and both operate
under the framework of a “tradeoff” system.112 This tradeoff is a simple
one: lawmakers who choose to expand an entity’s liability for tortious
109. Edmund Ursin, Judicial Creavitiy and Tort Law, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 229,
230–32 (1981).
110. Each state has its own statutory workers’ compensation framework. For a
fairly representative framework, see CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3600–3605 (West 2011 & Supp.
2012).
111. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42,
§§ 401–409, 115 Stat. 230, 237–41 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101
note (2006)).
112. The workers’ compensation system allows employees to recover damages
without having to prove negligence, but employees are entitled only to scheduled
damages for wage loss and cannot recover for their pain and suffering. JoEllen Lind,
The End of Trial on Damages? Intangible Losses and Comparability Review, 51 BUFF.
L. REV. 251, 267 & n.67 (2003) (quoting RICHARD EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS 860 (7th ed. 2000)).
The Fund has yielded a similar result. Congress passed the Fund to “serve as a
national expression of unity in the face of a tragedy unique in American history, as well
as to help survivors.” Michael I. Meyerson, Op-Ed., Losses of Equal Value, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 24, 2002, § 4, at 10, available at 2002 WLNR 4432480. The Fund entitled those
who had suffered physical injury and families of those who had died in the September
11th attacks to compensation on a no-fault basis. Robert M. Ackerman, The September
11th Victim Compensation Fund: An Effective Administrative Response to National
Tragedy, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 135, 144 (2005). The Attorney General appointed a
Special Master to administer the Fund and to distribute its moneys to each eligible
claimant according to “the extent of the harm to the claimant, . . . the amount of
compensation to which the claimant is entitled based on the harm to the claimant, the
facts of the claim, and the individual circumstances of the claimant.” Air Transportation
Safety and System Stabilization Act § 405(b)(1). But the Fund had tradeoffs built into it.
Professor Ackerman recapitulates these tradeoffs in his piece, explaining that negligence
would not be considered an aggravating factor, the court would not award punitive
damages and would reduce the total recovery by collateral benefits received, and the
Special Master’s decisions would “not [be] subject to judicial review.” Ackerman,
supra, at 144–45. For an application of the Fund’s framework to victim compensation
funds remedying other disasters, including Hurricane Katrina, see generally Nathan
Smith, Comment, Water, Water Everywhere, and Not a Bite To Eat: Sovereign
Immunity, Federal Disaster Relief, and Hurricane Katrina, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 699
(2006).
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conduct should simultaneously limit the damage awards to which plaintiffs
are entitled.113
Perhaps no one understood this tradeoff system better than Justice
Roger Traynor of the California Supreme Court.114 In Muskopf v. Corning
Hospital District, Justice Traynor led the California Supreme Court to
abolish the doctrine of state governmental immunity.115 In his opinion
for the court, Justice Traynor justified expanding the government’s liability
by reasoning that the government could spread the loss without much
difficulty: “If the reasons for [sovereign immunity] ever had any substance
they have none today. Public convenience does not outweigh individual
compensation, and a suit against [the government] is against an entity
legally and financially capable of satisfying a judgment.”116 The result
was an enormous expansion of California’s governmental liability.117
But Justice Traynor did not expand liability unthinkingly. He also
fervently understood the need to curtail damage awards.118 For that
reason, in Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines Justice Traynor complained
that pain and suffering damages in negligence cases were “increasingly
anomalous as emphasis shift[ed] in a mechanized society from ad hoc
punishment to orderly distribution of losses through insurance and the
price of goods or of transportation.”119 He realized these “losses [were]
borne by a public free of fault” and would be distributed among the public
as “part of the price” of doing business.120 In other words, if Los Angeles
Transit Lines had to pay a substantial money judgment, it would be
forced to defray those costs by charging more for its bus fares. Likewise,
113. Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Enterprise Liability Reexamined, 75 OR.
L. REV. 467, 473–77 (1996).
114. Justice Traynor rarely missed an opportunity to expand an entity’s liability.
See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171–72 (Cal. 1964) (holding
retailer strictly liable); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900–01
(Cal. 1963) (holding manufacturer strictly liable); State Rubbish Collectors Ass’n v.
Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282, 285–86 (Cal. 1952) (holding that plaintiffs no longer needed to
prove physical harm to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (“In my
opinion it should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability
when an article that he has placed on the market . . . proves to have a defect that causes
injury to human beings.”).
115. 359 P.2d 457, 458 (Cal. 1961). After much ado, in 1963 the legislature passed
the Tort Claims Act, which presently governs tort claims against the State of California
and its agencies and employees. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 810–997 (West 2005 & Supp.
2012).
116. Muskopf, 359 P.2d at 459.
117. See Laura Oren, Signing into Heaven: Zinermon v. Burch, Federal Rights, and
State Remedies Thirty Years After Monroe v. Pape, 40 EMORY L.J. 1, 53 n.301 (1991)
(referring to Justice Traynor’s Muskopf opinion as “pathbreaking”).
118. Nolan & Ursin, supra note 113, at 474–75.
119. 364 P.2d 337, 345 (Cal. 1961) (Traynor, J., dissenting).
120. Id.
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its liability insurer, who ultimately would end up paying the money
judgment, would pass along those costs by raising its insurance premiums.
Justice Traynor teaches an important lesson in Muskopf and Seffert: if
courts are willing to expand liability, they should be cognizant of the
effect that high damage awards may have on the general public.121 But
this tradeoff system begs two questions. First, is liability really expanding?
Second, do social developments warrant limiting damage awards?
B. Expanding Liability
Congress fundamentally expanded the United States’ tort liability
when it passed the FTCA in 1946.122 Before that time, a person could
not sue the United States to collect monetary damages because “the king
[could] do no wrong.”123 And although lawmakers preserved some
aspects of the United States’ sovereign immunity, modern jurists and
academics alike have questioned and criticized those exceptions with
great fervor.124 As a result, the United States’ limited sovereign immunity
is eroding.125 The path of the law indicates that this decay will continue.126

121. Nolan & Ursin, supra note 113, at 473–77.
122. James E. Pfander, Iqbal, Bivens, and the Role of Judge-Made Law in
Constitutional Litigation, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1387, 1406 n.109 (2010). For a
discussion of the extent to which plaintiffs were unable to assert otherwise meritorious
claims against the United States before Congress passed the FTCA, see United States v.
Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 154 (1963).
123. Reginald Parker, The King Does No Wrong—Liability for Misadministration,
5 V AND . L. R EV . 167, 167 (1952); accord Edwin M. Borchard, Governmental
Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1926). The concept of sovereign immunity has
its roots in the English feudal system:
Sovereign immunity began with the personal prerogatives of the King of
England. In the feudal structure the lord of the manor was not subject to suit in
his own courts. The king, the highest feudal lord, enjoyed the same protection:
no court was above him. Before the sixteenth century this right of the king
was purely personal. Only out of sixteenth century metaphysical concepts of
the nature of the state did the king’s personal prerogative become the sovereign
immunity of the state. There is some evidence that the original meaning of the
pre-sixteenth century maxim—that the king can do no wrong—was merely that
the king was not privileged to do wrong.
The immunity operated more as a lack of jurisdiction in the king’s courts
than as a denial of total relief. There was jurisdiction, however, in the Court of
Exchequer for equitable relief against the crown.
Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457, 458 n.1 (Cal. 1961) (citations omitted).
124. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 127–34.
125. For an example of this erosion, see Sauceda v. United States, No. CV-07-2267PHX-DCG, 2009 WL 3756703, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 5, 2009).
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For instance, in Feres v. United States the Supreme Court carved an
important exception into the FTCA by holding that active duty military
members could not sue the government for injuries they sustained
“incident to service.”127 And although the Feres decision has come to
embody a doctrine that is still intact today, its support has dwindled to
dangerous levels in both judicial and academic circles. In fact, its critics
fell one jurist short of obtaining a huge victory in United States v.
Johnson, a case in which four Justices of the Supreme Court voiced their
willingness to overturn the Feres decision.128 An odd bedfellow to
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, Justice Scalia noted that Feres
had received “widespread, almost universal criticism” and rested on
questionable judicial reasoning.129 Justice Scalia’s concerns have been
reiterated in academia, where scholars continually berate the “reluctantly
applied”130 Feres doctrine as “too broad,”131 “inequitable,”132 and a
“labyrinth.”133 As a result, Congress appears likely to overrule Feres in
the near future.134

126. Cf. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457
(1897) (describing how the law is predictable in its course). In his seminal work, Justice
Holmes explains that legal issues must be resolved in light of practical considerations.
Indeed, Justice Holmes thinks it is “revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV,” and he goes on to note that “[i]t is
still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since,
and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.” Id. at 469.
127. 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
128. See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 700–01 (1987) (Scalia, J., joined
by Brennan, Marshall, & Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (5–4 decision).
129. See id. (quoting In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242,
1246 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), appeal dismissed, 745 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1984)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
130. Flora D. Darpino, Eroding the Feres Doctrine—A Critical Analysis of Three
Decisions, ARMY LAW., Apr. 1996, at 26, 28.
131. Deirdre G. Brou, Alternatives to the Judicially Promulgated Feres Doctrine,
192 MIL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2007).
132. Kenneth R. Wiltberger, The Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medical
Accountability Act of 2009: An Opportunity To Overturn the Feres Doctrine as It Applies
to Military Medical Malpractice, 8 AVE MARIA L. REV. 473, 498 (2010).
133. Helen D. O’Conor, Federal Tort Claims Act Is Available for OIF TBI
Veterans, Despite Feres, 11 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 273, 313 (2008).
134. See, e.g., Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medical Accountability Act of 2009,
H.R. 1478, 111th Cong. (2009); see also H.R. 1478–Carmelo Rodriguez Military
Medical Accountability Act of 2009, OPENCONGRESS, http://www.opencongress.org/
bill/111-h1478/show (last visited Apr. 7, 2012) (resolving to amend the FTCA to allow
claims to be brought against the United States for “damages relating to the personal
injury or death of a member of the Armed Forces of the United States arising out of a
negligent or wrongful act or omission in the performance of medical, dental, or related
health care functions . . . that is provided by a person acting within the scope of the
office or employment of that person by or at the direction of the government”). The
2009 bill was a successor to a similar bill that failed to pass in 2008. See Carmelo
Rodriguez Military Medical Accountability Act of 2008, H.R. 6093, 110th Cong. (2008).
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The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Olson135 is another
example of the current trend, the focus of which is to expand the
government’s liability.136 The litigants in Olson asked the Court to
determine whether courts should hold the United States liable to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances if the
government engages in conduct in which a private individual does not
ordinarily engage.137 The Court agreed that courts should, holding that
federal mine inspectors are liable under the FTCA to the same extent as
“private persons who conduct safety inspections.”138
Olson has “ridiculous” implications because it exposes the United
States to broad liability, thus making the case for limited damages more
salient.139 Chelsea Durkin illustrated these implications quite persuasively
in her discussion of Tekle v. United States, a case in which the Ninth
Circuit reversed a judgment entered after the district court granted
summary judgment to the United States in an FTCA action in which the
plaintiff alleged federal agents falsely arrested him.140 Applying the
Olson framework, the court concluded the plaintiff raised genuine issues
of material fact as to whether the agents failed to adhere to the standard
with which private individuals must comply when making citizens’
arrests.141 Thus, according to Tekle’s logic, “federal officer[s] must actually
observe a person committing . . . a misdemeanor in order to arrest the
person, because ‘[r]easonable cause to believe that a misdemeanor has
been committed is not sufficient.’”142 If they do not, any arrest they
make will open the United States up to potential liability under the
FTCA.143
135. 546 U.S. 43 (2005).
136. See Durkin, supra note 3, at 280.
137. See 546 U.S. at 45. More specifically, the Court had to determine whether
federal mine inspectors should be held liable to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances. Id.
138. Id. at 47.
139. Durkin, supra note 3, at 280–81 (discussing those implications at length).
140. Id. at 280 (citing Tekle v. United States, 457 F.3d 1088, 1091–93 (9th Cir.
2006), withdrawn and amended by 511 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2007)).
141. Tekle, 511 F.3d at 853–56.
142. Durkin, supra note 3, at 280 (second alteration in original) (emphasis added)
(quoting Tekle, 457 F.3d at 1101). Holding federal officers—and by extension, the
United States—to this heightened standard may prevent them from fulfilling their duty to
keep the peace. Id. at 280–81.
143. Id. at 280. In a concurring opinion in Tekle, Judge Fisher warned that Olson
improperly “undermine[d]” the “unique obligations of law enforcement officials.” Tekle,
511 F.3d at 856–57 (Fisher, J., concurring) (citing Arnsberg v. United States, 757 F.2d

523

Perhaps Sauceda v. United States provides a more illuminating
example of Olson’s pitfalls.144 In that case, the plaintiffs sued the United
States under the FTCA, alleging that a Border Patrol agent negligently
deployed a controlled tire deflation device—a spike strip—ahead of their
approaching vehicle.145 The United States moved for summary judgment,
but the court denied the motion because whether the agent was negligent
was a factual determination for the jury: “[T]he alleged actions of [the
Border Patrol agent], if taken by a private person, could support a
finding of negligence. . . . [T]he throwing of an object at a fast-moving
vehicle ‘constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct a
reasonable person would exercise.’”146
Sauceda’s logic is inherently flawed. Civilians do not pursue suspected
criminals, nor do they throw spike strips when in pursuit.147 If they did,
they would likely be negligent.148 So if courts hold federal agents to that
standard, then logically the agents will be negligent.149 In turn, courts
will hold the United States liable under the FTCA.150 This expanded
liability highlights the importance of limiting damage awards.

971, 978–79 (9th Cir. 1985)). This was so, according to Judge Fisher, because “a private
citizen making a citizen’s arrest does not act under ‘like circumstances’ required by
§ 2674.” Id. at 857 (quoting Arnsberg, 757 F.2d at 979). In so arguing, Judge Fisher
forcefully criticized Olson’s failure to “provide courts with enough flexibility to preserve
law enforcement privileges.” Id.
144. Sauceda v. United States, No. CV-07-2267-PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 3756703 (D.
Ariz. Nov. 5, 2009).
145. Id. at *3.
146. Id. at *4 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Navajo Cnty. Juvenile Delinquency
Action No. 89-J-099, 793 P.2d 146, 147 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming lower court’s
finding that juvenile was delinquent because he threw water balloons at moving
vehicles)).
147. With this paradigm in mind, it is not surprising that the court could not find
any case in which a “private person deployed a [spike strip] in front of a passing
vehicle.” Id.
148. See id. (“A private person’s deployment of a [spike strip] under these
circumstances could be found to constitute an unreasonable use of force creating an
excessive risk of harm to Plaintiffs.” (citing Tekle, 511 F.3d at 854)); see also People v.
Piorkowski, 115 Cal. Rptr. 830, 835 (Ct. App. 1974) (holding that a statute regulating
citizens’ arrests did not permit bounty hunter to carry a weapon when arresting a
suspected robber).
149. See Sauceda, 2009 WL 3756703, at *4–5.
150. But cf. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 75 (1955) (Reed, J.,
dissenting) (“[The FTCA] should be construed so as to accomplish its purpose, but not
with extravagant generosity so as to make the Government liable in instances where no
liability was intended by Congress.”). The exact result later reached in Sauceda was
once decried by Justice Reed, who predicted that the expansive jurisprudential approaches
used in determining the scope of the United States’ liability under the FTCA would
logically extend liability to “injuries from negligence in pursuing criminals.” Id. at 76.
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C. Social Developments
As previously discussed, the FTCA provides plaintiffs with well-laid
avenues that can be used to reach into the government’s pockets.151 But
that, without more, does not warrant implementing a tradeoff system.
Unfortunately, there is more; the government is also faced with a bevy
of tort claims that present the potential for double recovery. Though the
lingering effects of the Gulf and Vietnam Wars and the U.S. military’s
efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan surely have sustained the veteran population
—in the former case—and ushered in a new generation of veterans—in
the latter case—relying on baseline VA medical care,152 less obvious—
and yet, as I will argue, more potent—is the effect that mounting TRICARE
costs have had and will have on this windfall problem.
TRICARE is a comprehensive health care insurance system available
to military personnel, retirees, and their dependents.153 An in-depth
discussion of TRICARE is neither useful nor desired, but a typical
policy allows its beneficiary to use private health providers, as long as
those providers are included in the TRICARE framework and as long as
the beneficiary pays a deductible and coinsurance.154
151. See supra Part IV.B.
152. Today, there are approximately twenty-two million living veterans of the
United States military. VA Benefits & Health Care Utilization, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS
AFFAIRS, http://www.va.gov/VETDATA/docs/Quickfacts/Winter_12_sharepoint_final.pdf
(last updated Feb. 3, 2012) (“Projected U.S. Veterans Population”). More than eight million
are enrolled in the VA health care system. Id. Since 2001, the VA has provided
medical care to more than 425,000 military personnel returning from Operation Iraqi
Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. Paul Sullivan & Lauren Hohle, More
Than 425,000 Iraq and Afghanistan War Veterans Treated by VA—More Than 250
New Patients Every Day, V ETERANS T ODAY (Sept. 16, 2009), http://www.veterans
today.com/2009/09/16/more-than-425-000-iraq-and-afghanistan-war-veterans-treatedby-va-more-than-250-new-patients-every-day/. Some have estimated that the VA will
treat up to one million veterans before both operations end. Id. In addition, veterans
from the Vietnam and Gulf Wars are still in need of VA health care. There are currently
almost eight million Vietnam-era veterans. Demographics, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFFAIRS,
http://www.va.gov/VETDATA/Demographics/Demographics.asp (last updated Sept. 30,
2006) (open “Period of Service” 2L Excel Spreadsheet). The Gulf War involved another
695,000 military personnel, many of whom have had to seek medical care for ailments
connected with service, especially Gulf War Syndrome. See Kevin J. Dalton, Comment,
Gulf War Syndrome: Will the Injuries of Veterans and Their Families Be Redressed?, 25
U. BALT. L. REV. 179, 180–81 (1996).
153. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, What is TRICARE?, TRICARE, http://www.tricare.
mil/mybenefit/home/overview/WhatIsTRICARE? (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
154. TRICARE Standard and TRICARE Extra, TRICARE (Jan. 2012), http://www.
tricare.mil/tricaresmartfiles/Prod_842/TRICARE_Standard_and_TRICARE_Extra_Fact
_Sheet_2012_Lo.pdf.
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TRICARE is extremely popular among our veterans.155 And with the
current influx of veterans, it is also extremely expensive to implement.156
Part of the problem is that TRICARE “enrollment fees and cost
shares . . . have not increased in a decade.”157 Benefits offered in the
private sector, however, have been met with increased enrollment fees
and cost shares.158 As a result, beneficiaries increasingly have abandoned
their private coverage in favor of TRICARE. 159 Reacting to this
development, Department of Defense Secretary Robert Gates has noted
the Department will include in its 2012 budget request “recommendations
to raise TRICARE premiums for some beneficiaries.”160
These higher premiums will force veterans to seek other options. In
that vein, many veterans may choose to rely on the VA’s baseline medical
benefits—free medical care. This makes the windfall scenario more
likely because the government will defend more FTCA claims brought
by veterans who are entitled to medical care that will not be deducted from
their damage awards for future medical expenses.161 When taken together
with the United States’ expanding liability, this development would
exacerbate the windfall problem—more veterans, more FTCA suits, more
requests for future medical expenses, and more drain on a treasury that is
already spinning out of control.
In all, these social developments justify implementing Justice
Traynor’s tradeoff system. Jurists and scholars alike have viewed the
government’s sovereign immunity with distaste, and that view largely
has won out; the government’s liability is expanding.162 The government
also must answer an influx of claims as the veteran population grows
and seeks to rely on the VA medical care to which it is entitled.
Mathematically, then, we can determine the total costs payable from the
Treasury by multiplying the United States’ probable liability by the

155. See Elisabeth Bumiller & Thom Shanker, Gates Seeking To Contain Military
Health Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/11/29/us/29tricare.html.
156. Vince Patton, Military Struggling with Rising Health Care Costs, MILITARY.COM
(2005), http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,RN_080305_Health,00.html?ESR
C=retirees.nl.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Tom Philpott, Gates Aims To Raise TRICARE Premiums, DAILY PRESS (Aug.
16, 2010), http://articles.dailypress.com/2010-08-16/news/dp-nws-milupdate-081620100815_1_health-costs-health-care-tricare.
161. FTCA suits brought by veterans covered under TRICARE do not present a
similar windfall problem because courts have generally held that a veteran’s damage
award for future medical expenses must be offset by TRICARE coverage. See, e.g.,
Mays v. United States, 806 F.2d 976 (10th Cir. 1986).
162. See supra Part IV.B.
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probable claims against which it must defend. And just as Los Angeles
Transit would charge higher bus fares if it had to compensate claimants
for pain and suffering, so too would the government pass along the costs
of tort judgments against it to the public.163 Accordingly, Justice Traynor’s
tradeoff should apply: courts should be cognizant of the effect that high
damage awards have in an era of expanding liability.164 If courts are
willing to expand liability, they should match that willingness with an
accompanying aim to limit damage awards.
V. A MORE SENSIBLE JURISPRUDENCE
This area of the law is muddled with bleak analysis and an unfocused
jurisprudence. By overcompensating veterans under the FTCA, courts
have closed their eyes to the statute’s express language. First, courts
have not held the United States liable to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances.165 Second, courts have not applied
the substantive law of the state in which the tort took place.166
Instead, courts must start their analyses by selecting an appropriate
analog. If courts select an inappropriate analog, they will survey the
wrong state case law. After courts select the proper analog, they should
apply the substantive law of the state where the tort took place, an FTCA
requirement that courts often neglect.167

163. See 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006) (authorizing Congress to appropriate moneys due
under final judgments against the United States in FTCA actions). Some scholars have
questioned why the United States, and not the government agency responsible for
causing the injury, should be held liable under the FTCA. See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK,
SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 106 (1983). Professor
Schuck contends that holding the United States liable does little to deter negligent
agencies and officials. Id. His argument rests upon the notion that agencies that do not
foot the bill lack incentives to implement deterrent measures. Id. For a rebuttal to
Professor Schuck’s argument, see William P. Kratzke, Some Recommendations
Concerning Tort Liability of Government and Its Employees for Torts and Constitutional
Torts, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1105, 1165–68 (1996).
164. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955) (“[W]hen
dealing with a statute subjecting the Government to liability for potentially great sums of
money, this Court must not promote profligacy by careless construction.”).
165. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006).
166. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006), construed in Richards v. United States, 369 U.S.
1, 9–12 (1962).
167. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 633, 644 (E.D. Wis. 1982)
(“[T]he question on which Wisconsin law does not control is whether a benefit received
from the government is, in fact, collateral to an FTCA judgment. To answer that
question one must look to federal law.”).
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A. Framing the Issue: Selecting a Workable Analog
Courts awarding veterans damages for future medical expenses fail to
hold the United States liable to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances.168 Instead, courts erroneously hold the United
States liable to the same extent as a private individual under exact
circumstances. 169 In this sense, courts have misapplied the FTCA’s
language to the collateral source rule.
The court in Feeley seems to have started this trend. In that case, the
court thought the appropriate question for resolution was whether, in a
lawsuit against a private defendant, state law required the plaintiff’s
damage award to be reduced by the VA medical care that the plaintiff
had received.170 Later courts followed Feeley’s lead, framing the
dispositive issue in a manner inconsistent with the FTCA’s language.
For instance, one court reasoned that “a private defendant cannot escape
an award of damages in a civil suit for future medical expenses by
contending that a plaintiff, who happens to be a veteran, is entitled to
free medical care at a VA Medical Center.”171
These courts erred. They correctly changed the United States to a
private individual but kept the circumstances—free VA medical care—
constant. The question is not whether state law would reduce damages
that a private defendant must pay by the amount of the plaintiff’s VA
medical care. Framing the issue that way is not faithful to the FTCA’s
text, which holds the United States liable to the same extent as private
individuals under like circumstances. 172 In addition, by keeping the
circumstances constant, courts have virtually predetermined the answer
in any state that has retained the collateral source rule. In other words,
in a state with a collateral source rule, the answer is a simple one: a
private defendant cannot reduce the plaintiff’s damage award by
government benefits to which the plaintiff is entitled.173

168. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
169. See infra Part V.A.
170. Feeley v. United States, 337 F.2d 924, 927 (3d Cir. 1964).
171. Harz, supra note 19, at 616 (citing Memorandum Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law & Order at 14, Heitzenrater & Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988)).
172. Cf. id. According to that article, allowing the government to furnish the
claimant with free medical services in lieu of paying a monetary award does not hold the
United States liable to the same extent as a private individual. See id. at 601–02. This is
so, according to the article, because private individuals are not entitled to use the tort
system as a “barter exchange.” Id. at 616.
173. See, e.g., Feeley, 337 F.2d at 927 (disallowing offset for future medical
expenses on the theory that a private defendant could not reduce a plaintiff’s damage
award by VA medical treatment plaintiff had received).
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Admittedly, selecting an appropriate analog in this situation poses
some analytical difficulties. The first difficulty is that comparing the
United States with a private individual is imperfect.174 The United States
is a multifaceted entity, replete with numerous departments and agencies; a
private individual, on the other hand, is a single organism.175 And at a
certain level, this distinction might matter insofar as the collateral source
rule is concerned. For example, some believe the collateral source rule
serves as a deterrent: it gives potential tortfeasors the incentive to take
precautions in conducting their affairs because courts will not reduce
damage awards by benefits to which plaintiffs may be fortuitously
entitled.176 Giving that warning to an individual tortfeasor may compel

174. LaBarge v. Cnty. of Mariposa, 798 F.2d 364, 367 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that
the federal government cannot be “exactly like a private actor”).
175. See SCHUCK, supra note 163, at 101–02, 106. Courts have long struggled to
reconcile these differences under the FTCA. See, e.g., Rayonier Inc. v. United States,
352 U.S. 315, 319–20 (1957) (refusing to hold the United States liable to the same extent
as a municipal corporation or other public body, despite similarities between the
entities); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64–65 (1955) (discarding the
government’s contention that the United States is not liable for activities that private
individuals do not perform); Paul F. Figley, Understanding the Federal Tort Claims Act:
A Different Metaphor, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1105, 1114 (2009); see also
Durkin, supra note 3, at 273–79 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s consistently wrong
approaches in determining the extent of the United States’ liability under the FTCA over
the decades). These and other difficulties once prompted Judge Max Rosenn of the
Third Circuit to refer to the FTCA as a “traversable bridge across the moat of sovereign
immunity.” Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 717 (3d Cir. 1979). For discussions
that expand upon that metaphor, see generally Richard W. Bourne, A Day Late, a Dollar
Short: Opening a Governmental Snare Which Tricks Poor Victims out of Medical
Malpractice Claims, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 87 (2000), which argues that the FTCA is filled
with loopholes such that claimants in medical negligence cases are unable to recover
when Congress categorizes medical workers as federal employees, and Dianne Rosky,
Respondeat Inferior: Determining the United States’ Liability for the Intentional Torts of
Federal Law Enforcement Officials, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 895 (2003), which contends
that the doctrine of respondeat superior is ill-suited for application under the FTCA.
Some scholars, however, do not share Judge Rosenn’s views and instead believe the
FTCA is an example of a federal statute that works. See, e.g., Jeffrey Axelrad, Litigation
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 8 LITIGATION 22, 55 (1981) (“The [FTCA] as a
whole is an example—perhaps a rare one—of a statute that generally achieves its
intended purpose.”).
176. John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law,
54 CALIF. L. REV. 1478, 1546–49 (1966). Others take it further, boldly arguing the
collateral source rule is punitive in nature. See, e.g., City of Salinas v. Souza & McCue
Constr. Co., 424 P.2d 921, 926 (Cal. 1967). This view, I submit in accord with Professor
Perillo, is “simply wrong.” Joseph M. Perillo, The Collateral Source Rule in Contract
Cases, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 705, 716 (2009) (characterizing the collateral source rule
as “patently nonpunitive”).
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it to be careful.177 When the tortfeasor is the United States, however, the
same warning may have little deterrent effect.178 This is because the United
States qua tortfeasor—the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—is
often different from the United States qua payer of damage awards—the
Treasury Department or, more precisely, the taxpayer.179 In this sense,
admonishing the DHS to “take precautions” might be superfluous because
some other government branch will be footing the bill for its negligence.180
This particular imperfection need not be resolved, at least not here,
because it matters only insofar as the collateral source rule in fact serves
as a deterrent, which is debatable for several reasons. First, advising
potential tortfeasors of the collateral source rule’s strictures may nonetheless
fail to encourage them to take precautions not to be negligent.181 Second,
177. Daena A. Goldsmith, Comment, A Survey of the Collateral Source Rule: The
Effects of Tort Reform and Impact on Multistate Litigation, 53 J. AIR L. & COM. 799, 801
(1988).
178. SCHUCK, supra note 163, at 106 (“The United States Treasury, the liability
point in the current system, is too remote from officials’ operating conditions in the field;
it neither understands particular programmatic functions and techniques nor possesses
the administrative resources necessary to implement such knowledge at street level.”).
In other words, the entity providing veterans with medical care—the VA—is quite apart
from the entity that caused them to suffer injuries—the Department of Homeland
Security. Nominally, both fall under the visage of the all-encompassing U.S. government, but
in very real respects, they are different.
Somewhat playfully, we can expand this conundrum. Within a given veteranplaintiff’s FTCA claim, we can identify up to five relevant entities. Suppose again that
the DHS injured the plaintiff and that, as a veteran, the plaintiff will receive medical care
from the VA. At this point, we have identified the tortfeasor and the supposed collateral
compensator. Who else remains? The Department of Justice, the entity sitting at the
defense table. The U.S. Treasury, the entity that will directly pay the damage award.
And the taxpayer, who will indirectly pay the damage award. At least from a deterrence
perspective, these distinctions surely matter, but I leave an in-depth analysis for another
day.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 102–03. In so arguing, Professor Schuck overlooks several valid points
that are recapitulated in Kratzke, supra note 163, at 1165–68. First, the FTCA waives
the United States’, not the at-fault agency’s, sovereign immunity, id. at 1166, which
implies that Congress did not intend the FTCA to serve as a deterrent, id. at 1167 (“In
the event that Congress wants tort suits to deter agency misconduct, it can make its will
understood.”). Additionally, shifting the costs of tort judgments to the negligent agency
does not take into account the reality that government agencies often reorganize. Id. (“In
the event of reorganization, both the responsibilities and the risks of liability for injurycausing misconduct are shifted from one agency to another.”). Finally, the doctrine of
respondeat superior—upon which the FTCA is based—rests upon the notion that the
“entity that reaps the benefits should be the one that bears liability for injuries caused by
employee misconduct.” Id. at 1166. For purposes of this discussion, that entity is the
United States, not the negligent agency.
181. Whether society can deter negligent conduct is a question to which no
satisfactory answer has been given. Compare Fleming, supra note 176, at 1548 (noting
that deterrence as a justification for tort liability should be “confined to situations where
it can realistically perform an admonitory function, namely, only against defendants
guilty of serious misconduct”), with Thompson v. Sun City Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d
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even if the collateral source rule sufficiently deters tortfeasors, it makes
larger damage awards more likely and thus fails to deter potential victims;
“[i]f tort awards are ‘too high,’ potential victims may have reduced
incentives to take efficient precautions against injury.”182
The second analytical difficulty is to determine the extent to which
courts should generalize the analog. The analog cannot be “free VA
medical care,” as Feeley and other courts have posited, because the
FTCA holds the United States liable to the same extent as a private
individual under like, not exact, circumstances.183 Perhaps it would be
correct to ask whether state law would reduce a plaintiff’s damage award
by moneys the defendant has agreed to pay the plaintiff in order to
“rectify the imbalance he [has] caused.”184 But that analog is also incorrect
because the United States’ obligation to pay preexists its negligence in
the situation at bar.
Instead, the issue, properly framed, is whether state law would reduce
a plaintiff’s damage award for future medical expenses if, independent
of tort, the defendant has already agreed to pay those expenses. As
framed, the issue accounts for the United States’ preexisting obligation
to pay for a veteran’s medical expenses. It purposefully avoids asking
whether the defendant has gratuitously promised to pay for the plaintiff’s
medical expenses because so framing the issue does not account for the
United States’ irrevocable obligation to pay a veteran’s medical expenses.
Further, the issue, as I have framed it, finds judicial support of the
highest order; in Molzof, the Supreme Court expressly agreed with this
construction.185 In remanding the case to the Seventh Circuit, the Court
noted that Wisconsin law might have “require[d] a setoff when a [private]
defendant already has . . . agreed to pay[] expenses incurred by the

605, 615 (Ariz. 1984) (reasoning that “deterrence of negligent conduct” is a tort
objective), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(c) (1979) (providing that one
goal of the tort system is to deter wrongful conduct). In other contexts, courts have
warmed to the view that negligent conduct cannot be deterred. See, e.g., Herring v.
United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144–45 (2009) (reasoning that the exclusionary rule, the
purpose of which is to deter police misconduct, had no place in a situation in which law
enforcement unlawfully seized evidence because the misconduct—negligently failing to
delete defendant’s arrest warrant from law enforcement database—could not have been
adequately deterred).
182. Krauss & Kidd, supra note 11, at 21.
183. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006).
184. Krauss & Kidd, supra note 11, at 48–50.
185. See Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 312 (1992).

531

plaintiff.”186 The Court did not ask the Seventh Circuit to decide whether
Wisconsin law would require a setoff if a plaintiff in an action against a
private defendant has received VA medical care.187 Doing so would not
have been faithful to the FTCA’s command, which holds the United
States liable to the same extent as private individuals under like, not
exact, circumstances.188
Additionally, generalizing the analog from “free VA medical care” to
“preexisting obligation to pay”—as I do in framing the issue—stays true
to the framework enunciated in Indian Towing Co. v. United States.189
In Indian Towing, plaintiffs sued the Coast Guard for a host of maladies,
including failing to check and repair a lighthouse’s battery.190 The Supreme
Court held that the proper analog was a private person who “undertakes
to warn the public of danger and thereby induces reliance.”191
Indian Towing’s teaching is simple: the FTCA must be read logically.
The Court in Indian Towing could have held the United States liable to
the same extent as a private defendant who owned a lighthouse and
failed to check its battery and sun relay system. It did not, however,
because private individuals do not normally own or operate lighthouses,
and even fewer private individuals own lighthouses and fail to maintain
them properly.192
186. Id. (emphasis added).
187. Unfortunately, on remand, the Seventh Circuit glossed over the Supreme
Court’s instructions. The court failed to apply the correct analog and thus looked to state
law that had no bearing on the issue before the court. See Response, supra note 71, at
14–15 (arguing Molzof’s application of Wisconsin’s collateral source law was
“questionable” and “not well-reasoned”). The Molzof court asked the wrong question; it
asked whether a plaintiff could recover from a private defendant for medical expenses
incurred, even though the plaintiff was entitled to free treatment at a naval hospital.
6 F.3d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1993). In failing to ask whether Wisconsin would “require[] a
setoff when a [private] defendant already has paid (or agreed to pay) expenses incurred
by the plaintiff,” the court failed to hold the United States liable to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances. 502 U.S. at 312. To the extent that it
improperly framed the issue, Molzof’s disposition is incorrect. For a more detailed
analysis of the state law to which Molzof erroneously adhered, see infra Part V.B.2.
188. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
189. 350 U.S. 61, 62–65 (1955).
190. Id. at 62 (repeating in the Court’s opinion plaintiff’s allegations that the Coast
Guard failed to “check the battery and sun relay system”; “check[] the lighthouse . . . to
make a proper examination of the connections which were ‘out in the weather’”; “repair
the light”; or warn the public of the various malfunctions).
191. Id. at 64–65.
192. Recognizing this paradigm, the government in Indian Towing contended it was
not liable because private individuals do not operate lighthouses and thus no analog
existed. Id. at 64. In so arguing, the government asked the Court to adopt a framework
in which the government, its agencies, and employees would not be liable for negligent
performance of “uniquely governmental functions.” Id. The Court disagreed. Id. at 69.
Alternatively, in Indian Towing, the United States argued it should be liable to the same
extent as a municipal corporation. Id. at 65. The dissenting Justices found the argument
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As in Indian Towing, applying a narrow analog to the scenario I have
developed in this Comment is illogical. Courts should not ask whether
state law would reduce a plaintiff’s damage award by the VA medical
care to which he or she is entitled because so framing the issue does not
account for the most critical aspect of the collateral source rule: the
benefit provider, who can be either the defendant or an independent
source. Reading out the source of the benefit produces only one answer:
a state applying a traditional collateral source rule would not reduce a
plaintiff’s damage award in a suit against a private defendant by VA
medical care the plaintiff had received or was to receive.193 The collateral
source rule clearly forecloses such an offset.194
On the other hand, asking whether state law would reduce a plaintiff’s
damage award for future medical expenses by medical expenses the
defendant has an obligation to pay to the plaintiff does not presuppose
one answer. Instead, it requires courts to survey state law and make a
meaningful determination. Additionally, only after generalizing the
analog will courts survey the appropriate state law, namely, the extent to
which state law allows a plaintiff to recover future medical expenses
when a private defendant has already agreed to pay those expenses.
B. Resolving the Issue: Applying State Law
After framing the issue properly, the next step is to resolve it.
Consistent with the FTCA, I suggest courts should apply the substantive

persuasive, contending that under state law a municipal corporation was not liable for
injuries sustained as a result of negligent failure to maintain traffic lights. Id. at 75–76
(Reed, J., dissenting). The dissent then analogized street traffic lights to “navigation
lights,” which were at issue in the case at bar. Id. at 76. Concluding that municipalities
would not be held liable for failing to maintain navigation lights under state law, the
dissent would not have held the United States liable for its failure to properly maintain
the lighthouse. Id. Consistently, however, the Supreme Court has refused to adopt the
position that the dissent advocated in Indian Towing. See, e.g., United States v. Olson,
546 U.S. 43, 44 (2005). Instead, under the prevailing view, the words of the FTCA
“mean what they say, namely, that the United States waives sovereign immunity ‘under
circumstances’ where local law would make a ‘private person’ liable in tort.” Id.
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006)).
193. See, e.g., Molzof v. United States, 6 F.3d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1993) (considering
that issue, as framed, and holding VA medical benefits are collateral under Wisconsin
law).
194. This is so because the collateral source rule operates as a mechanism by which
the tort system ensures the tortfeasor bears the entire loss without benefitting from the
plaintiff’s good fortune. See Note, supra note 8, at 741.
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law of the state where the tort occurred.195 A review of each state’s
applicable law is too ambitious a task for this Comment, but some examples
are apropos. To that end, this Part reexamines Feeley and Molzof from
the correct perspective.
1. Feeley Reconsidered
In Feeley, an on-duty U.S. Post Office employee negligently injured a
veteran in Pennsylvania.196 In determining whether the veteran could
recover future medical expenses despite his entitlement to VA medical
care, the court began its analysis by framing the issue incorrectly, asking
whether “Pennsylvania state law requires that in a suit against a private
defendant the hospital and medical care conferred by the [VA] be deducted
from the [damage] award.”197 The court then cited to Pennsylvania’s
collateral source rule, which states that the “victim of a tort is entitled to
receive from his tortfeasor the full amount he is entitled to . . . regardless
of what the former receives from other sources.”198 Reciprocally, under
Pennsylvania law, if a tort victim receives compensation from the
tortfeasor, then the victim is not entitled to receive from the tortfeasor
the full amount to which the victim would otherwise be entitled.199
195. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9–14 (1962).
196. 337 F.2d 924, 926 (3d Cir. 1964).
197. Id. at 927.
198. Id. at 928 (quoting Boudwin v. Yellow Cab Co., 188 A.2d 259, 259 (Pa.
1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
199. In an effort to reform the state’s tort system, the Pennsylvania legislature has
passed two statutes modifying the collateral source rule in professional liability actions.
See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8553 (West 2007); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.508
(West 2007 & Supp. 2011). Under the first statute, courts must reduce a plaintiff’s
damage award by benefits a claimant is entitled to receive under an insurance policy. 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8553. This modification does not affect the outcome of Feeley
because the VA is not a health insurer nor is free VA medical care an insurance benefit.
The second statute reforming the collateral source rule in Pennsylvania applies only in
the context of medical negligence actions. 40 PA . C ONS . S TAT . A NN . § 1303.508.
Section 1303.508 provides “a claimant in a medical professional liability action is
precluded from recovering damages for past medical expenses . . . to the extent that the
loss is covered by a private or public benefit or gratuity that the claimant has received
prior to trial.” Id. This provision does not apply to life insurance policies, pension plans,
social security benefits, medical benefits that must be repaid to the Department of Public
Welfare, and public benefits “paid or payable under a program which under Federal
statute provides for right of reimbursement which supersedes State law for the amount of
benefits paid from a verdict or settlement.” Id.
Neither statute affects Feeley’s reconsidered outcome because Feeley was not a
professional liability action. See Feeley, 337 F.2d at 926 (noting U.S. Post Office
employee negligently injured plaintiff). If Feeley had involved professional negligence
or, more specifically, medical negligence, then one could argue section 1303.508 should
apply, especially because it prevents plaintiffs from recovering only past medical
expenses, thereby implicitly allowing plaintiffs to recover future medical expenses. See
40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.508. The better analysis, however, is to disregard

534

[VOL. 49: 501, 2012]

Future Medical Expenses
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

In applying the collateral source rule, the court stated the general rule
that plaintiffs may recover doubly if they receive payment that is a “true
gift.”200 It then held the plaintiff was not allowed a double recovery
because government benefits were not true gifts “bestowed on the
veteran.” 201 Oddly enough, the court then declared Pennsylvania law to
be unhelpful in determining whether the VA medical benefits were
collateral.202 As previously discussed, the court ultimately allowed the
plaintiff to recover future medical expenses after applying the federal
test.203
The Feeley court confused its analysis by asking whether VA medical
benefits are collateral.204 That is simply not the issue before the courts.205

section 1303.508 in medical negligence actions arising under the FTCA for several
reasons. First, section 1303.508 refers only to “collateral sources” and does not appear
to dictate the result if the tortfeasor is the same source who has paid—or agreed to pay—
moneys to the plaintiff. See id. Additionally, section 1303.508 should not apply in
FTCA actions to the extent that its provisions allow plaintiffs to recover damages despite
their entitlement to social security benefits, welfare benefits, and a narrow category of
federal benefits for which the government has a right to reimbursement. See id. This is
so because in enacting these provisions, the legislature probably did not contemplate
situations in which the United States is the tortfeasor and payer of these benefits. Accord
Amlotte v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 2d 922, 927 (E.D. Mich. 2003). Thus, applying
section 1303.508 in FTCA actions ignores the likely legislative intent.
200. 337 F.2d at 930. According to the court, allowing a plaintiff to recover doubly
if the plaintiff has received payment as a gift is justified because the donor’s intent
necessarily implies that the donor did not give the gift with any intention to compensate
the plaintiff. Id. at 928. The tortfeasor cannot use gratuities to reduce payments the
tortfeasor must make to the plaintiff because “[g]ratuitous payments cannot be linked to
the imbalance between the tortfeasor and victim.” Krauss & Kidd, supra note 11, at 31.
201. 337 F.2d at 932.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 935.
204. Id. at 932. So framing the issue is particularly problematic because numerous
states have modified the collateral source rule by statutorily defining which benefits are
collateral. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1606 (2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§ 2906 (2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6303(4) (West 2000); N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§ 4545 (CONSOL. 2007 & Supp. 2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 31.580 (2011). Many states—
Michigan, to take one example—have statutorily defined government benefits as
collateral to prevent courts and juries from considering them when awarding damages to
a plaintiff. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6303(4). The problem is that when the
Michigan legislature passed this statute, “it [did] not necessarily take into consideration
cases in which the United States is a defendant—as well as the payer of those benefits—
nor would it since federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over injury claims against
the United States for money damages.” Amlotte, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 927. Recognizing
loopholes like these, several courts have held that the United States may assert state
statutory caps on damages even though it does not strictly fit within the statutory
framework. See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 821 F.2d 1428, 1431–32 (9th Cir. 1987)

535

Not to belabor the point, but the issue, properly framed, is whether state
law would reduce a plaintiff’s damage award for future medical expenses
by expenses the defendant has an obligation to pay to the plaintiff.206
And under Pennsylvania law, victims are not entitled to receive from
tortfeasors the full amount to which they are entitled if those victims
receive compensation from the tortfeasors.207 Thus, a defendant who has
an obligation to pay the plaintiff’s medical expenses is entitled to an
offset under Pennsylvania’s collateral source rule, which disallows
double recovery if the plaintiff receives moneys from the tortfeasor.
2. Molzof Reconsidered
In Molzof, a veteran sued the United States after receiving medical
maltreatment at a VA hospital in Wisconsin.208 In framing the issue, the
Seventh Circuit asked whether Wisconsin law allowed a plaintiff to
recover future medical expenses in an FTCA action “even though the
plaintiff is entitled to free medical care from the government as a
veteran.”209 The court held the plaintiff could recover those expenses,
reasoning that VA medical benefits were collateral under Wisconsin
state precedent.210 For that proposition, the court relied primarily on
Smith v. United Service Automobile Ass’n, which held that a plaintiff could
recover medical expenses from his insurance company even though he
obtained free medical treatment for his injuries at a naval hospital.211
As in Feeley, the Molzof court framed the issue incorrectly and
improperly applied state law. The court’s consideration of Smith
demonstrates this error.212 Smith relied solely on Kopp v. Home Mutual
Insurance Co., which involved the interpretation of a plaintiff’s
automobile liability insurance policy.213 Under the terms of the insurance
policy in Kopp, the insurer agreed to “pay all reasonable [medical]
expenses incurred . . . [t]o or for the named insured.”214 The insurer in
Kopp contended the policy was not operative because the plaintiff never
(applying California’s $250,000 statutory cap in medical negligence cases to the United
States).
205. See supra Part V.A.
206. See supra Part V.A.
207. See Feeley, 337 F.2d at 928 (quoting Boudwin v. Yellow Cab Co., 188 A.2d
259, 259 (Pa. 1963)).
208. 6 F.3d 461, 462–63 (7th Cir. 1993).
209. Id. at 464.
210. Id. at 466.
211. See id. at 466–67 (citing Smith v. United Serv. Auto. Ass’n, 190 N.W.2d 873
(Wis. 1971)).
212. See id. (citing Smith, 190 N.W.2d at 873).
213. Kopp v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 94 N.W.2d 224, 225 (Wis. 1959).
214. Id.
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“incurred” any expenses while hospitalized, as required by the provision.215
The court disagreed and enforced the provision.216 According to the court,
and as a general principle, the provision did not operate to allow a plaintiff
to recover damages for medical services that a third-party volunteer
gratuitously bestowed onto the plaintiff.217 The provision did apply in
the case before the court, however, because the plaintiff indirectly
“incurred” expenses for his hospitalization by paying premiums to his
Blue Cross health benefit plan.218
Smith involved the interpretation of an insurance policy identical to
the one in Kopp.219 According to the court in Smith, whether the policy
allowed the plaintiff to recover hinged on whether the medical care to
which the plaintiff was entitled was gratuitous or something for which
he had paid a consideration:
If the United States Navy, in providing free hospital and medical services to
its personnel, is a “third-party volunteer” providing a gift or gratuity, Kopp
controls to bar recovery by the plaintiff here. If the Navy-provided hospital
and medical services are provided for a “consideration,” and are not
gratuitously provided, Kopp controls to authorize recovery by the plaintiff
here.220

Smith concluded the provision was operative, reasoning the plaintiff paid
a consideration for his medical benefits.221
Relying on Smith, Molzof concluded that veterans paid a “consideration”
for their VA medical benefits.222 The court then pointed to Smith for the
proposition that a plaintiff is entitled to recover medical expenses if the
plaintiff has paid a consideration for them.223 By grounding its analysis
on Smith’s fact-sensitive point, however, the Seventh Circuit misread
215. Id. The plaintiff did not incur any expenses in connection with his
hospitalization because he subscribed to a Blue Cross hospital benefit plan. Id. Under
that plan, the plaintiff paid quarterly premiums to Blue Cross. Id.
216. Id. at 226.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 225.
219. Smith v. United Serv. Auto. Ass’n, 190 N.W.2d 873, 874 (Wis. 1971). Under
the insurance policy, the insurer promised “[t]o pay all reasonable expenses incurred
within one year from the date of accident for necessary medical, surgical, x-ray and
dental services, including prosthetic devices, and necessary ambulance, hospital,
professional nursing and funeral services . . . [t]o or for the named insured.” Id. at 874
n.1.
220. Id. at 874.
221. Id. at 875.
222. Molzof v. United States, 6 F.3d 461, 466–67 (7th Cir. 1993).
223. Id.
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Smith and Kopp as announcing general propositions about the recoverability
of damages in Wisconsin. Neither case provides any meaningful
generalities, nor does either purport to decide whether and when benefits
are collateral; instead, Smith and Kopp are informative on the subject
only insofar as an insurance policy uses the word incur ambiguously.224
If Molzof had framed the issue properly, it probably would not have
considered Smith and Kopp at all.
The proper issue before the court in Molzof was whether Wisconsin
state law would require a plaintiff’s damage award for future medical
expenses to be reduced by the value of medical expenses that the
defendant has a preexisting obligation to pay to the plaintiff. As Molzof
noted, Wisconsin’s collateral source rule provides that “a personal injury
claimant’s recovery is not to be reduced by the amount of compensation
received from . . . sources ‘collateral’ to the defendant.”225 In other
words, under Wisconsin law a plaintiff’s recovery will be reduced by the
amount of compensation the plaintiff has received from sources not
independent from the defendant. Thus, in a case in which a defendant
has a preexisting obligation to pay the plaintiff’s medical expenses,
Wisconsin’s collateral source rule would allow an offset. This means
the Molzof court should have reduced the plaintiff’s damage award for
future medical expenses by the value of the VA medical care to which
he was entitled.

224. Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 201 N.W.2d 745, 752 (Wis.
1972).
225. Molzof, 6 F.3d at 464 (quoting Lambert v. Wrensch, 399 N.W.2d 369, 372 n.5
(Wis. 1987)). In an effort to reform its collateral source rule in the context of medical
negligence actions, in 2005 the Wisconsin legislature passed section 893.55, which
provides that “[e]vidence of any compensation for bodily injury received from sources
other than the defendant to compensate the claimant for the injury is admissible in an
action to recover damages for medical malpractice.” WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.55 (West
2006).
In Molzof, the plaintiff sustained injuries after receiving medical treatment at a VA
hospital. 6 F.3d at 462. Thus, insofar as section 893.55 applies to medical negligence
actions, it would be of some utility if Molzof were decided today. How much utility it
would be, however, is less clear. Section 893.55 is purely evidentiary because it merely
allows, without more, litigants to introduce evidence of a certain kind. And as an
evidentiary statute, section 893.55 likely is not the vehicle a court would use to
determine whether a damage award should be reduced by benefits to which the plaintiff
is entitled because, after all, such a reduction or nonreduction is necessarily substantive
in nature. Instead, to determine whether a damage award were subject to a setoff, a
Wisconsin court deciding Molzof today would simply apply Wisconsin case law in
accordance with the well-settled principle that state substantive law applies in FTCA
actions. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9–12 (1962).
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3. Justifying the Results
Using this framework to reevaluate Feeley and Molzof is faithful to the
FTCA’s command. But that is not the only benefit. This framework
also comports with a fundamental objective of the tort system: to make a
person whole.226
Of course, according to tort reformists, the collateral source rule
necessarily contravenes tort law’s objective to make a person whole
because it often allows a plaintiff to recover a damage award that
exceeds his or her injury-related costs.227 Indeed, the principle that
underlies the collateral source rule is that the victim should receive the
windfall, and not the tortfeasor, if either party has an opportunity to
obtain one—if a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor pays for
part of the victim’s loss.228 But what result if neither party has an
opportunity to receive a windfall? This situation arises if the source who
has paid—or agreed to pay—the victim’s loss is, coincidentally or not,
also the defendant.229 If society allows the victim to recover that which
he or she has already received—or will receive, in the case of an
enforceable promise—then that victim necessarily recovers doubly.230
In the same vein, society also forces the defendant to pay twice.231
Some scholars have justified allowing the victim to recover in the
latter situation by conceptualizing the make-whole principle narrowly.232
226. See McInroy v. Dyer, 47 Pa. 118, 121 (1864). See generally George P.
Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972); Stephen R.
Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449 (1992).
227. Jamie L. Wershbale, Tort Reform in America: Abrogating the Collateral
Source Rule Across the States, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 346, 349 (2008). Tort reformists
conceptualize the collateral source rule as a mechanism by which society can place the
burden of the loss on the tortfeasor, not the helpless victim. See Note, supra note 8, at
741.
228. Adams v. Turner, 238 F. Supp. 643, 644–45 (D.D.C. 1965).
229. Id. Society encourages this situation because it means the tortfeasor has
“attempt[ed] informally to make amends for [his or her] actions.” Molzof, 6 F.3d at 465.
230. Some disagree that the victim recovers doubly in this scenario. See, e.g.,
Krauss & Kidd, supra note 11, at 26–28. That view implies a victim recovers only
insofar as the tortfeasor honors the victim’s request to be compensated. Karsten v.
Kaiser Found. Health Plan of the Mid-Atl. States, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1253, 1258 (E.D.
Va. 1992), aff’d, 36 F.3d 8 (4th Cir. 1994).
231. See Adams, 238 F. Supp. at 644–45.
232. See, e.g., Krauss & Kidd, supra note 11, at 26–28 (approaching the problem
through the prism of “corrective justice”). For a discussion of the objectives of tort
compensation, see Symposium, Baselines and Counterfactuals in the Theory of
Compensatory Damages: What Do Compensatory Damages Compensate?, 40 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1091 (2003).
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To them, forcing the defendant to pay twice is acceptable if the defendant’s
duty as tortfeasor does not overlap with the preexisting duty to pay part
or all of the victim’s loss.233 For example, Professor Michael Krauss
developed a factual scenario in which
Larry negligently prevents Jane from catching her plane to Atlanta, causing
Jane to miss a meeting and lose $1000. Fortunately, Jane had purchased an
insurance policy against precisely this sort of occurrence and receives a
payment from that insurance carrier in the amount of $1000. The insurance
carrier is a sole proprietorship owned by Larry.234

Professor Krauss concludes that Jane may recover $1000 from Larry
because Larry’s furnishing Jane with that same amount under the
insurance policy is “not a purposeful act in rectification of the imbalance
he had created.”235
As Professor Krauss noted,236 this view found support in Karsten v.
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.237 In Karsten, the plaintiff brought
a diversity lawsuit in federal court against Kaiser for medical negligence,
alleging one of its employees negligently delivered her premature
stillborn fetus.238 She sought damages for the costs of a surgical procedure
that became necessary after the physicians allegedly botched the delivery of
her child.239 As the plaintiff’s health insurer, Kaiser fulfilled its insurance
obligation by conducting the procedure free of charge.240 Thus, Kaiser
argued, the plaintiff could not recover the market value of the second
procedure because (1) she did not incur any expenses, and (2) Kaiser had
already paid these sums.241 The court disagreed and allowed the plaintiff
to recover these damages, reasoning:

233. Krauss & Kidd, supra note 11, at 48.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 49. Krauss concedes that Larry compensated the victim in “precisely the
amount of the harm caused by his negligent act,” but he nonetheless argues “the benefit
was not meant to rectify the imbalance he caused.” Id. at 48. With this statement I am
reminded of Emily Sherwin, Compensation and Revenge, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387,
1405 (2003), which argues that “remedies that pass as civil and compensatory are not
solely concerned with losses, but also provide an outlet for vengeance.” Though Krauss
stops short of arguing the plaintiff’s damage award is a function of outright vengeance,
he does seem to imply that a healthy measure of retribution factors into our make-whole
principle. See Krauss & Kidd, supra note 11, at 50.
236. Krauss & Kidd, supra note 11, at 49 (citing Karsten v. Kaiser Found. Health
Plan of the Mid-Atl. States, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1253, 1258 (E.D. Va. 1992), aff’d, 36 F.3d
8 (4th Cir. 1994)).
237. 808 F. Supp. 1253.
238. Id. at 1254. Because the court’s jurisdiction was based on diversity of
citizenship, it had to apply the substantive law of Virginia. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1256.

540

[VOL. 49: 501, 2012]

Future Medical Expenses
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

The first payment of medical bills by the defendant was in its capacity as
plaintiff’s insurer . . . . The defendant is now being asked to pay these same
medical expenses as compensatory damages. Even though the same defendant
is being asked to pay the same damages twice, it is patent that the nature of the
two payments is different. The nature of the first is as a payment from
defendant as insurer to the plaintiff as the insured. The nature of the second is
as a payment from defendant as tortfeasor to the plaintiff as the party injured by
the defendant’s negligence. It is axiomatic that the plaintiff is entitled to receive
the benefit of her bargain under the insurance contract, irrespective of the fact
that the carrier servicing that contract may also be the tortfeasor.242

In narrowly construing the make-whole principle, Professor Krauss’s
and Karsten’s views have implications that society is not likely willing
to accept.243 For instance, under this theory of corrective justice,244
numerous benefits the government has conferred on the plaintiff, including
all federal, insurance, and employee benefits, are collateral.245 In addition, it
yields to the victim an unnecessary windfall. This windfall is unnecessary
because the plaintiff can be compensated for his or her loss without
either party receiving a windfall.246 Perhaps most problematic is that
corrective justice relies too heavily on the tortfeasor’s mindset in making
the victim whole.247 For one, plaintiffs probably do not care whether

242. Id. at 1257–58 (footnote omitted).
243. As numerous state legislatures have demonstrated, one objective of tort reform
is to modify the collateral source rule so as to limit, not expand, its application. See
Marshall & Fitzgerald, supra note 23, at 71–78 app. I.
244. Krauss & Kidd, supra note 11, at 49. Krauss believes the make-whole
principle is an incoherent concept. Id. at 28. He prefers a tort system that focuses on the
tortfeasor’s duty to “right the wrongs caused to the victim” instead of one that asks
whether the tortfeasor has made the victim whole. Id. at 22 (emphasis omitted).
245. Although these benefits are often collateral, Krauss and Karsten have created a
non sequitur in which the benefits are necessarily collateral because, under their view,
the payer of the benefits did not give them to the victim so as to “rectify the imbalance
he caused.” Id. at 48–50.
246. Adams v. Turner, 238 F. Supp. 643, 644–45 (D.D.C. 1965) (“[The underlying
principle of the collateral source rule] does not apply in a situation where the collateral
source is the defendant himself. Under those circumstances no one gets a windfall and if
a recovery were allowed under those circumstances the result would be that the plaintiff
would receive a double recovery and that the defendant would be mulcted twice for the
same item of damages.”).
247. For classic discussions of the theory of corrective justice, under which a
tortfeasor’s liability is premised on its duty to repay the victim for the injustice it has
caused, see generally Jules L. Coleman, The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice, 77
IOWA L. REV. 427 (1992); Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, 37 ARIZ.
L. REV. 15 (1995); and Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403
(1992). I note parenthetically, however, that this philosophy “originated under primitive
law as a means of punishing wrongdoers and assuaging the feelings of those who had
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tortfeasors intend to make them whole; they primarily care that the
tortfeasors pay up, one way or another.248 Society presumably feels the
same way, especially because it must absorb the costs of judgments that
tortfeasors ultimately pass along to it.249 Requiring tortfeasors to pay
once, then, is in society’s interests.
The better result is one that accommodates a main objective of the tort
system—to compensate the injured party—as well as the philosophy that
underlies the collateral source rule—to burden the tortfeasor with the
entire loss.250 The view I take is that courts should reduce damages if
the tortfeasor itself mitigates the victim’s loss because that scenario does
not conflict with either goal.251
As proof that no conflict exists, reconsider Professor Krauss’s
hypothetical in which Larry negligently causes Jane to incur $1000 in
losses but also reimburses her for the loss as part of his obligation as her
insurer.252 Under my view, reducing Jane’s damage award is acceptable
because the objectives of the tort system and the collateral source rule
are both satisfied. The tort system’s objective in compensating Jane for
her loss is satisfied because Larry’s payments to Jane cover her losses.
The collateral source rule’s objective in forcing the tortfeasor to bear the
entire loss is also satisfied because Larry, and not some other source,
puts Jane in the same position she was in before missing the plane.
been wronged.” Seffert v. L.A. Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337, 345 (Cal. 1961) (Traynor,
J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
248. See Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort
Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 275–76 (2001). After all, the plaintiff’s
primary motivation in filing a lawsuit is to collect damages, not to impress upon the
defendant the plaintiff’s moral belief that the defendant’s conduct was wrongful. Id. at
284–85. The economically motivated plaintiff does not care about the tortfeasor’s “duty
to repair,” which carries with it the notion that the tortfeasor must feel the wretch of its
wrongdoing. Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67
IND. L.J. 349, 365 (1992). But cf. Tom Baker, Teaching Real Torts: Using Barry
Werth’s Damages in the Law School Classroom, 2 NEV. L.J. 386, 390–91 (2002) (noting
the “individual justice perspective” of tort law views the system as a mechanism by
which society can right “individual wrongs” and “restore the moral balance between” the
duties a plaintiff and defendant owe each other).
249. Seffert, 364 P.2d at 345 (Traynor, J., dissenting) (“[Excessive damages]
become increasingly anomalous as emphasis shifts in a mechanized society from ad hoc
punishment to orderly distribution of losses through insurance and the price of goods or
of transportation. Ultimately such losses are borne by a public free of fault as part of the
price for the benefits of mechanization.”).
250. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 219–20 (5th ed. 1998)
(defending the collateral source rule as a mechanism by which society forces tortfeasors
to internalize the full costs of their conduct); see also Molzof v. United States, 6 F.3d
461, 465 (7th Cir. 1993) (arguing that the collateral source rule does not allow a
tortfeasor to “reap the benefits of the plaintiff’s foresight in obtaining coverage for future
harm or his good fortune in obtaining compensation gratuitously”).
251. See Note, supra note 8, at 741.
252. See Krauss & Kidd, supra note 11, at 48–50.
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Under the result that Professor Krauss reaches, however, neither objective is
satisfied. The result he advocates leaves Jane better off than she was
before missing the plane, thus overly satisfying the main objective of the
tort system.253 Krauss also ignores the role of the collateral source rule
because under his view Larry bears more than the entire loss.
4. One Last Retort
I have not yet addressed one lingering issue, one outside the FTCA’s
black letters, one that veteran-plaintiffs likely would use as a retort to the
framework I have proposed and defended in this Comment, one that
proceeds as follows: extending the collateral source rule’s negative shell
to include compensation veterans will receive at some distant point in
the future is wholly inappropriate and not tailored to our tort system’s
basic theory of compensation. Reduced to simple terms, the retort is that
substituting future compensation for present compensation is plainly
unfair. In my rejoinder, I focus not on the narrow future-present distinction
as it pertains to collateral source law but rather on its two broader
conceptual equivalents: first, that plaintiffs are not required to use their
damage awards for any specific purpose or at any specific time and,
second, that plaintiffs are entitled to receive their damage awards not
periodically over time but rather in a lump sum at the time of judgment.254
Tinkering with these familiar tort principles, and even abrogating
them, is not uncommon. Tort reformists, for example, have subjected
them to a healthy measure of criticism, arguing these standards regularly
allow plaintiffs to recover windfalls by compensating them up front for
future losses that, “should [they] die prematurely or should [their]
condition[s] unexpectedly improve,” may never come to pass.255
Legislatures, too, have eschewed them altogether. Take, for instance,
section 667.7 of California’s Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act
of 1975 (MICRA), which provides that “future damages” awarded in a

253. Kenneth W. Simons, Compensation: Justice or Revenge?, 40 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1415, 1416 (2003) (“Overcompensation occurs when . . . benefits conferred by the
injurer are not deducted [from the damage award].” (emphasis added)).
254. See supra pp. 504–05 and note 15. I note parenthetically that a sustained
defense of my views on this tort paradigm would require separate, stand-alone treatment;
in this Comment, I opt instead for a superficial glaze, one I believe is sufficient for the
reader to understand the issue.
255. See Developments in the Law—Lawyers’ Responsibilities and Lawyers’
Responses, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1547, 1573 (1994).
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medical malpractice action are to be paid, at either party’s request, not in
a lump sum but rather periodically as the plaintiff incurs the losses.256
MICRA as a whole, it should be recalled, was passed after Governor
Jerry Brown complained of “serious problems that had arisen . . . as a
result of a rapid increase in medical malpractice insurance premiums,”257
and section 667.7 is plainly a fruit of that concern. Comparable concerns,
though admittedly on a much smaller scale, attend veteran-plaintiffs’
recoveries under the FTCA, yet no comparable fruit exists. In this vein,
extending the collateral source rule’s negative shell to include compensation
the United States will pay to veterans is conceptually valid and perhaps
even appropriate.
VI. CONCLUSION
Veterans should not be able to recover future medical expenses in
FTCA actions to the extent that they are entitled to free VA medical
care. By holding otherwise, courts commit errors of policy, law, and
logic. On a policy level, the courts drain the U.S. Treasury. Congress
must then defray the costs of the damage award by passing them along
to the public. This loss-spreading phenomenon is significant because its
potential to adversely affect the public increases as the United States’
liability expands. Additionally, at a purely legal level, two provisions of
the FTCA do not prescribe the result reached by the courts. First, the
FTCA requires courts to hold the United States liable to the same extent
as a private individual under like, not exact, circumstances. Second, it
calls for application of state substantive law, not federal common law.
As for logic, the courts allow veterans to receive a windfall. Under the
circumstances, savvy plaintiffs will pocket the cash award and avail
themselves of the VA care to which they are entitled. This paradigm of
overcompensation violates the make-whole principle of the tort system.
It similarly untethers the collateral source rule from one of its logical
underpinnings, namely, that the tortfeasor should not bear less—or
more—than the entire loss.

256. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 667.7 (West 2012) (applying only to awards totaling
at least $50,000 in future damages).
257. Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Cmty. Hosp., 204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 673 (1984) (en
banc).
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